Introductory Background Notes
1999 “National Symposium, The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation”
Into a world in which virtually every major interest group, including business,
labor, human rights, religious, policy makers, criminal justice interests, the
general public, and economists all either opposed inmates participating in the
civilian labor force or tolerated it without complaint, the 1999 “National
Symposium” presents - however tentatively given- perhaps the first modern
economic argument for integrating inmates into the normal US labor force. And it
did so involving highly prominent US labor economists from left to right, probably
to the mutual surprise and discomfort of all participants.
Like others, my economic views on inmate labor arise from many sources, but
among them three stand out, namely (1) my efforts to reconcile inmate labor
policies with my education, that is, my understanding of the broader body of
western microeconomic theory and history, (2) the theoretical work of 1992 Nobel
economist Gary Becker’s work on discrimination, which saw discrimination as
refusing to use otherwise productive people – able to competitively produce
dollar-valued goods and services – because of the greater psychic value of denying
them work; and (3) the work of Texas A&M economist Morgan Reynolds, who is
the first economist in my experience arguing for business use of prison labor for
the good of the overall economy.
Dawning for me was extraordinarily slow- from at least 1986 into 1999 - and
further proof, I think, of the tremendous difficulty a priori in perceiving or
recognizing discrimination, despite a posteriori, afterwards, its seeming
obviousness all along. It reminds me today of the phenomenal difficulty inherent in
thinking differently from all others around.
Having finally achieved my PhD in 1986, and despite my career turning away from
prisoner statistics in 1979 to energy, I continued mulling about US prison labor
going forward. I had been greatly blessed by the National Correctional Industries
Association as observer to the National Work Group on inmate labor, a
collaborative of prison industry stakeholders and opponents wrestling over inmate

labor issues, thereby giving me the opportunity of hearing debates by stakeholders
1
of the underlying issues. By 1998, however, I’d begun to suspect that the real
problem in US prison labor was not the “normal” economy, but in fact the
accumulation of differences from the normal economy that constituted US prison
labor primarily providing discrimination benefits to arguing stakeholders. In fact,
it began to dawn on me that what I was really observing was an ongoing tug
among warring stakeholders for each gaining upper hands benefits from extracting
preferred benefits from differential treatment of unprotected incarcerated workers,
who continued to be treated primarily as not really needing money in the first
place.
Thanks to an amazing opportunity afforded by a Soros grant from the Open Society
Institute, we then were able to contract four prominent economists known for their
wider expertise and with no known views on prison labor, and to obtain their view
on whether the US economy – really GDP – would be better served if inmates were
welcomed or excluded from the US labor force.
The four economists engaged were –
1. Ray Marshall, University of Texas, former Carter secretary of labor and
well known economist on race discrimination;
2. Alan Krueger, Princeton, later Obama administration chair, Council of
Economic Advisors (joined by Jeffrey Kling);
3. Richard Freeman, Harvard, prominent labor economist; and
4. Steven Levitt, U. Chicago, more recently of “Freakonomics” fame.
Professor Levitt was recommended to us by Gary Becker.
Study Suggestion: Conclusions barely emerge from individual presentations, but
become clearer as the day’s interactions proceed and authors and reviewers
reflect. Therefore I suggest not stopping at reading each speaker’s presentation,
but to continue through the Q&A’s as well as closing observations.
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I remain tremendously grateful to the National Correctional Industries Association and to US prison industries
practitioners, whom I see as dedicated public servants trapped in an ossified and inherently failed social structure.

Finally, even in my own case, the clarity of conclusions did not snap into place
until some months later. And, while not disavowed, my impression is that neither
the Open Society Institute or the speakers themselves found the topic – despite its
breakthrough content – a lucrative or fruitful field for further pursuit.
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Background
Introduction
Most objections to jail and prison inmate open-market employment are fundamentally
either economic or criminal justice objections. The May 21, 1999 National symposium,
“The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation,” addresses the root economic
question, whether allowing inmates to compete for (participate in) open market jobs is
good or bad for the economy. Except for briefly touching on recidivism and
rehabilitative effects, the project does not address criminal justice issues relating to
inmate employment.
For the symposium, prominent mainstream U.S. economists provide introductory
opinions and propose economically beneficial general policy directions for inmate labor
force participation. The symposium also includes panelist views representing
stakeholders affected by inmate labor policies, plus limited feedback from symposium
participants.
The symposium was funded by the Center on Crime, Communities & Culture of the
Open Society Institute (OSI) as part of its efforts spurring public debate on important
issues affecting crime, poverty, and inner cities.
The event was hosted by the George Washington University Department of Economics,
which also monitored project interactions with the economists.
Background
Either by law or custom, inmates in U.S. jails and prisons are barred from open-market
jobs. In addition to state prohibitions, the most stringent Federal restriction, the
Sumners-Ashurst Act of 1948, prohibits the transport of prison-made goods in interstate
commerce. Although a succession of Federal and state changes, beginning with “The
Percy Amendment” in 1979,” allow inmates to hold open market jobs under specified
conditions, fewer than 3,000 of the nation’s 1.8 million local, state, and Federal adult
inmates held open market jobs in 1998.1 About 600 thousand work in prison upkeep or in
1

Excluding about 40,000 inmates estimated to be on work release near the ends of their sentences. Source
for inmate employment: draft, “Inmate Labor in America’s Correctional Facilities, A Preliminary Report of

traditional prison industries serving government purchasers. Inmates working in
traditional prison industries go unpaid or receive small gratuities, usually far less than a
dollar an hour.
Current arguments, particularly as articulated by business, organized labor, and human
rights groups, generally oppose inmates holding open-market jobs. Primary objections
arise from a criminal justice perspective (Unemployment is “good punishment”), for
reasons of human rights (Prison labor is exploitative or abusive), or on economic grounds
(Inmate employment takes jobs from civilian labor, is exploitative or abusive, and drives
down the civilian wage rate).
Privately-owned industries oppose prison industries – and by extension, inmate
employment – primarily because prison industries receive advantages (subsidies) not
available to taxpaying firms, including exclusive rights to government markets, taxpayer
provided land and capital equipment, exemption from taxes and regulation, and
exemption from virtually all pay and benefits for the incarcerated labor force.
Organized labor generally opposes inmate labor on economic grounds, seeing the
involuntary, unpaid, and unprotected inmate labor force – whose living costs are paid by
taxpayers - as unfairly competing against civilian labor. Unions also oppose using inmate
labor as strike breakers or to otherwise weaken unions, and they oppose prisons abusing
the labor force with coercion, low or no pay or benefits, reduced conditions of safety and
protection, and utter powerlessness (including a prohibition against union membership).
Human rights groups, such as the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union, generally oppose prison labor as a form of slavery, exploitation, and abuse.
Further, human rights groups are particularly concerned that the state will use inmate
earnings to fund additional expansion of the U.S. prison system.
Others see gains in inmate work. Foremost, corrections agencies strongly prefer inmate
work to (1) cost-effectively reduce idleness – and prison violence, and (2) educate and
rehabilitate inmates. Interestingly, unionized prison staff tend to prefer inmate work for
the sake of improved inmate morale and safety, and thereby temper broader union
opposition. Representatives of inmates often favor the education, training, discipline, and
income – however slight – offered by work. And some argue that it is not employment
but inmate unemployment that harms the economy, by reducing National output,
reducing consumer opportunities and raising prices, decreasing civilian job opportunities
and slowing employment growth, increasing welfare and taxes, and undermining both the
economic welfare and the social fabric of low-income homes and communities,
especially inner cities. They see inmates’ absence subtracting about 2 percent from the
male labor force, de facto denying compensation to crime victims, leaving more
unsupported minor children of inmates than inmates (about 2.2 million), shifting the
the American Bar Association’s Subcommittee on Correctional Industries,” Washington, D.C., April,
1998. Source for inmate population: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin,
“Prisoners in 1998,” NCJ 175687, Washington, D.C., August, 1998.

financial burden of supporting inmates and their children to taxpayers and about 1 million
mostly lower income females (the mothers and grandmothers of inmates’ children), and
creating “unemployment” equaling 20 percent or more of the poorest neighborhood’s
minority male populations. They see inmate and inmate family poverty reducing the
demand for goods and services, thereby reducing civilian employment and costing the
Nation hundreds of thousands of civilian jobs. They also see inmate unemployment
spawning conditions for future crime.
To date, inmate open-market employment has been minimal. Enabling legislation,
overseen by the Federal “Prison Industry Enhancement Certification” (PIE) program,
now allows private firms to use state and local inmate labor if the employment is
voluntary, it pays locally “prevailing wages,” does not displace existing civilian
employment, requires consultations with business and organized labor, and imposes
deductions from inmate earnings for taxes, victims compensation, board and room, and
child and family support. About 40 states now permit inmates to hold open-market jobs
under PIE requirements. Yet after more than twenty years, fewer than 3000 inmates about two tenths of one percent of the Nation’s 1,800,000 jail and prison populations hold open-market jobs. And many of those jobs are hotly contested, with private
businesses arguing that prison-facilitated firms are, in fact, displacing existing civilian
employees and firms.
Further, while enlightening and illustrating stakeholder good will, an ongoing series of
meetings, working groups, and forums on the subject has little budged public policies or
noticeably softened debate.2 Action on inmate employment appears stalled.
Therefore, in order to gain deeper understanding of at least some critical facets of the
debate, and in order to spur more effective debate and policy change, more intense focus
on clarifying economic aspects of inmate labor policies was devised.
The Symposium, The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation
Design
Believing that (1) economic issues are central to the debate, (2) non economic aspects
could be better understood if economic aspects were clearly distinguished, and that (3)
entangling economics with other issues is a common source of confusion, the symposium
and these written opinions on “The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation,”
were designed to focus on economic features of inmate labor.
Other critical design features include -
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Recent ongoing groups include the American Bar Association Correctional Industries Subcommittee and
the National Working Group on Inmate Labor (NWGIL); National meetings of the Correctional Industries
Association (CIA) and the American Correctional Association and the May, 1998, “National Prison
Industries Forum” in Washington, D.C. showcase recent debates on prison industries and inmate labor.

●

The basis for judging “good” or “bad” is competitive economic theory and
experience, accepting the objectives (primarily maximizing production of
goods and services), means, and analytic tools of conventional Western
economics. Positions reflecting a general opposition to the competitive model
are excluded; for example, Marxist labor views would not be persuasive in the
symposium setting.

●

Economists are chosen for their general prominence in mainstream economics
and not for views on inmate labor force participation. The choice reflects an
intent to view inmate labor primarily as a standard economic issue.

●

The process intends to be objective and neutral, beginning with the questions
asked and the economists invited, and accepting whatever outcomes occur, so
long as they emanate from competitive mainstream economics. For example,
no economist was identified, interviewed, or chosen based on any declared or
presumed position on inmate labor force participation.

●

The primary focus is on persons as economic participants and not on
institutions, that is, on the labor force participation of persons who are
incarcerated, and not on the prison industrial structure in which employment
occurs.

●

The principal focus is on labor force participation, that is, the right to
compete for employment, and not on the right to have jobs or to be “given”
jobs.

●

The focus is overall economic consequences a nd not criminal justice effects;
therefore, the focus is on national output, income, and employment, as well as
on broader economic consequences for major affected groups.

In sum, the design differs from typical debate in that it treats inmate labor as a standard
economic issue in the broad context of general economic efficiency and not as a criminal
justice or correctional issue. Therefore, economic consequences for Gross Domestic
Product, employment, prices, and income are of greater importance to this presentation
than traditional features such as prison order, rehabilitation, and compensation. By
extension, the design emphasizes broader classes of economic winners and losers not
traditionally identified or considered in inmate labor debate.
Throwing the issue of inmate employment into the general sphere of economics has the
additional advantages of (1) setting the debate into a context and broader experience
familiar to many, and (2) making the issue of inmate labor addressable by a far wider
body of expertise than traditionally involved. Both for learning and for political utility,
public policy makers, opinion makers, journalists, corrections and correctional industry
representatives, and stakeholders of every stripe can turn to local universities, economic
research groups, think tanks, and others for assessments, insights, and guidance on the

issue of inmate work, all while providing stakeholders from many sectors a common
ground for review, analysis, and communication.
Although not originally highlighted, effects on future crime and recidivism became a
prominent feature of the economic discussion, in the context of the economic costs and
benefits of reducing future crime.
●

A secondary objective of the effort is to entice the economics profession into
more extensively examining issues of inmate labor and prison industries.
Therefore, recognizing that the selected economists are not specialists in the
area, their views for the symposium should be seen as introductory opinions
clearly subject to additional insight and modification.

Recruiting economists began in late 1998 and concluded in January 1999. In March, the
George Washington University (GWU) Department of Economics agreed to host the
symposium and monitor interactions with the economists. The economists exchanged
first drafts in late March and April; CRS staff briefly joined the interchange in late April,
asking questions and recommending clarifications, in all cases monitored by GWU.
Two additional features joined the symposium late in the process. First, in order to
represent key stakeholders within a tight schedule, the symposium added a panel of
expert stakeholders, including of taxpayers, children and families, minorities, women,
inmates, prison industries, business, and labor (Representatives of victims and the elderly
were invited). Stakeholders were invited to represent the effects of actual and proposed
inmate labor policies on constituencies of importance. Second, although interactive
discussion among participants was always anticipated, professional facilitation services
were added in early Spring.
The symposium was moderated by Amy Kaslow, an independent broadcast journalist on
national and international economics issues. Ms. Kaslow is a regular contributor to
National Public Radio’s “Marketplace”; from 1989 to 1996, Ms. Kaslow was the lead
economics correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor.
The Questions
Each economist was asked to explicitly address four questions:
1.
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Applying your economic specialty, and separate from any criminal justice
costs or benefits, are bans on prison inmate labor force participation “good” or
“bad” for the U.S. economy? Please explain, identifying economic winners
and losers, and state your opinion of the net overall economic gain or loss to
the economy, along with any important limitations on the opinion.3

“Good” or “bad” came to be interpreted as with respect to output of material goods and services as
measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), though its intended meaning by CRS staff was to distinguish

2.

Specifically, from your economic specialty, will expanded inmate
participation in the economy create, destroy, or have no effect on civilian
employment in the United States? Explain.

3.

Applying your economic specialty, what steps are essential to improve the
economic contribution of the incarcerated labor force?

4.

If there are any criminal justice or correctional effects distinguishable from
economic aspects, please identify and explain them, particularly their effects
on net social benefits or costs.

material goods and services from immaterial economic “goods” such as the satisfaction from
discrimination, punishment, or preference for dealing with some persons over others.
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Presentation by Ray Marshall
Preliminary Opinion on the Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation
Biography
Ray Marshall is Professor Emeritus and Audre and Bernard Rapoport Centennial Chair in
Economics and Public Affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs of the
University of Texas at Austin. Professor Marshall served four years as U.S. Secretary of
Labor in the Carter Administration.
Professor Marshall has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at
Berkeley. A member of the University of Texas faculty since 1962, he came to the LBJ
School in 1981. He is a founder and member of the board of the Economic Policy
Institute. He is a member of the Clinton Administration’s Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, co-chair of the Commission on the Skills of the
American Workforce, chair of the board of the National Center on Education and the
Economy, and past President of the International Labor Rights Fund.
Professor Marshall has authored more than thirty books and monographs, including
Thinking for a Living, Education and the Wealth of Nations, Losing Direction, and
Families, Human Resources, and Economic Development.
Professor Marshall retired from teaching at the LBJ School in August, 1998.
Presentation
Introduction
This paper addresses the following priority questions on the economics of inmate
labor force participation (ILFP) presented in the guidelines for this project:
1. Are bans on ILFP good or bad for the economy in terms of impact on the GDP?
2. What effect will the expansion of ILFP have on civilian unemployment?
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3. What are the key steps in improving the economic contributions of the inmate labor
force?
4. What non-economic (e.g., criminal justice, correctional or other) effects should be
addressed regarding ILFP?
My responses to these questions are:
1) The overall effects of ILFP on the economy and the work force are likely to be
relatively small and therefore less important, at least in the short run, than an
examination of the effects of the expansion of ILFP on particularly affected groups:
the inmates, their families and victims; workers, unions and companies in industries
most heavily impacted by ILFP; the criminal justice system; and the general public. I
have been asked to pay particular attention to the views of organized labor on ILFP.
2) The appropriate standard for assessing the impact of ILFP on the economy and
particular groups should be the social benefits and costs of particular measures taken
to expand ILFP. In other words, the appropriate policy question should be to seek a
set of policies that will expand or contract ILFP while achieving specified public
policy options and minimizing adverse effects for free labor markets. Expanding GDP
is not, by itself, likely to be a significant policy objective; ILFP is, however, likely to
influence human resource development objectives for disadvantaged workers.
3) As a labor economist primarily concerned with public policy, my approach
will be to outline measures that might advance the public welfare by addressing the
legitimate concerns of different parties without yielding to the illegitimate. Even
though I have done very little work on the ILFP issue, I have done extensive work on
labor markets—both as an academic researcher and as a designer and administrator of
interventions to address particular problems. The approach that I have found useful in
such work is to examine an issue from a variety of perspectives—theoretical,
historical, quantitative and behavioral. Policy work also tends to be interdisciplinary.
I do not think, for example, that we can or should separate purely economic analyses
from criminal justice considerations since crime, incarceration and recidivism are
serious economic, criminal justice, and human development problems. A good
orienting hypothesis is that the present criminal justice and corrections system in the
United States is not very efficient and does too little to rehabilitate offenders and
prevent crime. The system apparently has interrelated, self-perpetuating components
which make it difficult to change. It also seems that the American system is very
different from its counterparts in other countries.1 (Indeed, this subject could benefit
greatly from comparative adaptive learning.) We therefore should attempt to develop
policies that will help transform the criminal justice system and make it more
effectively deter crime, rehabilitate and punish criminals, and reintegrate ex-offenders
into society. Such policies would greatly reduce the enormous and growing human
and economic costs of crime and incarceration.
4) As noted below, I do not have sufficient evidence to make adequate policy
recommendations. My analyses, conclusions and recommendations are therefore
based on very preliminary assessments of the evidence and designed more to
stimulate discussion than to be serious policy proposals.
1

See, for example, Elliott Currie, Crime and Punishment in America (NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1999).
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I will first give more complete answers to the first two questions and then devote
most of my remarks to the last two. I start with a brief historical overview and then
proceed to an analysis of some limited evidence on the pros and cons of expanding
the industrial (i.e., non-institutional) employment of inmates. The evidence,
preliminary as it is, suggests that an expansion of ILFP could be in the legitimate
interests of all the parties and therefore in the public interest. My main caveat is that
expansion should be done through a constellation of policies to transform the present
criminal justice system while improving the conditions of all of the parties, except
perhaps the illegitimate interests of those who benefit from present arrangements.
The first question is whether bans on ILFP are good or bad for the economy. As
noted, the short answer to that question is that the bans on inmate labor have very little
impact on GDP because prison industry output ($1.6 billion in 1997) is a very small
fraction of the GDP (over $8 trillion). Moreover, the total prison labor force (611,000 in
1997)2 is small relative to the civilian labor force of 136 million.
Critics of ILFP are concerned less about the absolute numbers of prison inmates
working than they are the trends and the impacts on particular industries, places and
groups. The number of federal prison inmates has increased from 66,000 in 1990 to
113,000 in 1997; the number of state inmates increased from 708,000 to 1,132,000 during
those years.3 There have been similar increases in the size of the inmate work force,
though non-institutional work opportunities have not kept pace with rising inmate
populations, so industrial work forces constitute a smaller percentage of the prison
populations than they did ten years ago. At the federal level, where a larger proportion of
inmates are employed, 33 percent of inmates were employed in 1988 but only 18 percent
were employed in 1996.4
In addition to the trends, critics of ILFP are concerned that prisoners will be
exploited and that low paid inmates will undercut free labor wages and working
conditions. If they are paid at all, inmate workers generally earn less than $1 per hour.
The range in the five-step federal industrial pay scale is from $0.23 to $1.15 per hour.5
Unions have long been concerned about the negative impact of convict labor on free
workers’ wages and working conditions, as well as the adverse affects of prison labor on
workers’ ability to organize and bargain collectively. It therefore is not surprising that the
prohibitions on the employment of convicts in competition with free workers coincided
with the growth of unions in the nineteenth century and during the 1930s. Before these
2

Of these, 498,000 were involved in support work in their institutions, 75,000 were assigned to traditional
prison industries producing goods and services mainly for state and federal agencies, and only 2,429 were
employed in state and local prisons by private firms producing goods and services for open markets (Rod
Miller, Mary Shillon, and Tom Petersik, “Inmate Labor in America's Correctional Facilities,” Discussion
Draft, Preliminary report to the ABA’s Subcommittee on Correctional Industries, April 1998.)
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Prisoners in 1997, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, August 1998.
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Hearings, House Subcommittee on Crime, September 18, 1996.
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In 1991 prison workers in non-industrial activities earned between $0.12 and $0.40 per hour; most (55%)
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restrictions were imposed, it was not uncommon for convicts to be used to break strikes.
Indeed, unions still complain about the use of inmate labor to weaken strikes, prevent
unionization, and undercut wages.
In order to understand the nature and probable impact of relaxing the restrictions
on the industrial employment of inmates, it is useful to review the history of convict
labor, examine the circumstances that caused these restrictions, and to analyze some
experiences with the employment of prison labor. It also is helpful to examine the
arguments advanced by various interested actors. Such an examination reveals the nature
of the evidence (as well as the political alignments) for and against relaxing the
restrictions on the employment of inmates.
Historical Overview
Early in American history, prisoners were assigned to hard work of various kinds,
which was considered necessary to punish inmates for their crimes and to purge them of
the evils that led to their criminality. In addition, work always has been considered an
effective way to control prisoners.
In order to reduce the public costs of incarceration, various methods evolved to
employ convicts in the production of goods and services to be sold in the public or
private sectors. The first of these was the public-account system whereby governments
sold the products of prison labor on the open market. The second was the state-use
system, which prevails today, where inmates produce goods and services to be sold to or
used by government agencies. The third was the contract system, making a comeback
since federal enabling legislation in 1979, where the state sells prison labor to private
firms. And the fourth was the lease system which vests in private companies the
responsibility for the custody, care, discipline, and employment of inmates. Before the
1930s, the contract system predominated in the North and the lease system in the South.6
During the nineteenth century, reformers, businesses and unions successfully
restricted the contract labor system. Union opposition moderated when contract bidding
caused wage differentials between convicts and free workers to converge, but intensified
when these differentials widened. Unions also naturally opposed the use of convicts as
strikebreakers.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, campaigns against contract labor
were particularly vigorous in states like New York where unions were strong. Unions
became stronger throughout the United States after national and federal labor
organizations were created in the last half of the nineteenth century. Unions gained wider
public support for their campaigns against contract labor during the recessions of the
1870s and 1890s. The compromise worked out to settle the differences between the
proponents and opponents of the commercialization of prison labor was the state-use
system.
The convict lease system was eliminated gradually in the South by the 1930s,
mainly because it had become uneconomical but also because of public outcries
following well-publicized exposes of appalling working conditions and often corrupt
relationships between prison businesses, politicians, prosecutors and courts. The system
6
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became unprofitable when employers bid up convict costs to approximate those of free
workers.7 As in the North, Southern states replaced the lease system with state-use
policies, thus shifting the control and employment of convict labor from the private to the
public sector. In the North, convicts worked behind walls in the state-use system, while
in the South chain gangs and state farms predominated. However, by the 1940s, well
publicized abuses and the increase in the proportion of white prisoners, especially during
the Great Depression, caused chain gangs to virtually disappear, although they are
making a comeback in some places.8
Federal Policies
During and after the Great Depression the federal government adopted a number
of measures to curtail the use of inmate labor in competition with free workers. The
Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929 subjected the interstate shipment of prison-made goods to
the restrictions on their sale in intrastate commerce previously imposed by many states.
The 1935 Ashurst-Sumners Act added federal enforcement to Hawes-Cooper and made it
a federal crime to knowingly export prison-made goods into a state that prohibited the
sale of such goods. In 1940, Congress amended Ashurst-Sumners to make it a federal
crime to transport and sell prison-made goods regardless of the provisions of state law.
These laws greatly restricted the industrial employment of inmates. Garvey reports that
“In 1885, 90% of the prison population worked. In 1997, the figure was only 6.2%.”9
The failure of the state use system to provide more meaningful industrial employment to
inmates is attributed to a number of factors, including mediocre management, poor
legislative oversight, and the failure of state agencies to honor requirements that state
agencies purchase prison-made goods. However, all of these problems appear to be
related to the absence of effective competition for prison industries.
At the federal level prison labor is organized by Federal Prison Industries, Inc.
(FPI—often referred to by its trade name, UNICOR), a nonprofit corporation created in
1934. In 1997 FPI operated 97 different factories in 46 locations but employed less than
20 percent of the federal prison population. FPI produces products to be sold exclusively
to federal agencies. In 1996, 38 percent of FPI’s sales were in the furniture industry and
22 percent were in textiles and apparel.10 Despite a requirement that federal agencies give
preference to UNICOR products, FPI accounts for less than 2 percent of federal
procurement.
In 1979 Congress passed the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) Act which
allows certified private companies to employ state and local prison labor and to sell
prison-made goods in interstate commerce, an action that some observers thought might
restore the contract system. To be certified, a company must pay prevailing wages,
demonstrate that inmates will not displace free workers, consult with unions, and make
deductions from inmates’ compensation (not to exceed 80% of gross wages) for room
7
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and board, taxes, family support and contributions to victim compensation funds.
Between the end of 1979 and June 15, 1995, about 1,600 PIE inmates had gross earnings
of over $44 million, $23.6 million of which was deducted for victims’ programs ($3.6
million), costs of incarceration ($10.5 million), family support ($3.4 million), and taxes
($6.1 million).
The 1994 Crime Bill largely deregulated prison industry and freed inmate labor
from most federal restrictions, thus opening the sale of prison products to any private
market. However, according to one prison labor expert, PIE’s growth is restricted by the
prevailing wage requirement, which does not permit companies to compensate for the
additional costs of doing business in prisons (e.g., additional security costs); he concludes
that “Few industries will find it worthwhile to set up shop behind prison walls if they are
forced to pay inmates the prevailing wage—unless, of course, the state offers a subsidy to
offset these higher costs.”11
Arguments For and Against Removing the Restrictions on Inmate Labor
PIE and FPI supporters argue that these programs’ safeguards prevent them from
undercutting free labor wages and working conditions or from unfairly competing with
private sector companies.12 Critics, on the other hand, argue that UNICOR routinely
violates PIE’s prevailing wage and business protection requirements, rendering those
safeguards largely ineffective.13 Business representatives argue, in addition, that FPI’s
mandatory sourcing requirement gives UNICOR an unfair competitive advantage.
Unions: At the present time unions believe that inmates should work, but generally
oppose the expansion of the sale of convict-made products in competition with private
industry or the employment of convicts in competition with free workers.
The AFL-CIO has protested inmate working conditions as well as the threat
expanded ILFP would pose to free workers. In 1997, for example, the federation’s
Executive Council adopted a resolution protesting “the widespread use of prison labor in
the U.S. in unfair competition with free labor and…ask[ed] that a complaint be filed with
the International Labor Organization charging that the U.S. has violated ILO convention
No. 105, which prohibits the use of forced or prison labor for economic development.”14
Consistent with Samuel Gompers’ declaration that organized labor wanted “more
constant work and less crime, more justice and less revenge,” national and state
AFL-CIO affiliates encourage “the training of prisoners both to help in their
rehabilitation and to reduce recidivism after their release. But, always with this caveat:
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Prison labor never should be used to compete with free labor nor to replace it.”15 An
AFL-CIO background paper specifically endorsed training programs like the South
Central Iowa AFL-CIO’s apprenticeship partnership with the Iowa Department of
Correction Prison Industries Division (discussed below), but noted that most prison
training did not adequately prepare inmates for skilled work, partly because of an
overemphasis on work at the expense of training. Union leaders have protested the use of
prison labor to displace public as well as private employees and note that “From Alabama
to New York, the old-fashioned chain or work gang is making a comeback.”16 In addition,
the AFL-CIO contends that “Prison security has been compromised to accommodate the
shipping needs of private operators.”17 Texas AFL-CIO president Joe Gunn alleges that
“one high tech firm, American Microelectronics…closed its Austin facilities and laid off
150 employees to move its operation behind bars” in a private prison at Lockhart, Texas
where “convicts end up with about 84 cents an hour for their work.”18
The AFL-CIO charged that PRIDE, a non-profit consortium of private companies
in Florida (discussed below) “has the sole contract with Florida corrections for all work
performed by prisoners in the state. In 1996…Inmates received from 15-50 cents an hour
for their work, with no minimum wage protection and no workers’ compensation.”
John Zalusky of the AFL-CIO’s economic research department told the U.S.
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee that it was “wrong for state-owned
prisons to create or support businesses paying convicts substandard wages to take jobs
from free labor who have committed no crime…” The AFL-CIO agreed that inmates
“should be working and should not be idle, and that the work they do should impart
values that are useful to the free world. However, we believe that working at exploitive
wages sends exactly the wrong message and bestows the wrong values. It says that hard
work is unrewarding and that Government is an oppressor.”19 Finally, “The AFL-CIO
supports the self-use concept of prison labor with effective business and labor input in the
decision process to ensure minimal adverse impact on free labor.”20
Of course, neither employers or unions take a uniform approach to the expansion
of prison industries. Most unions oppose the sale of prison-made goods in open markets
and the use of convict labor in competition with free workers. However, unions are more
concerned about the wages and conditions of convict labor than they are about the fact
that convicts are required to work, which they generally support. Moreover, unionized
prison guards favor work by prison inmates because of its demonstrated effectiveness in
improving prison safety, behavior and morale. Overcrowded prisons where inmates have
nothing but idleness and boredom to occupy their time create dangerous and explosive
situations for guards and inmates alike.
AFL-CIO Public Employee Department, Prison Labor: Are We Heading Back to the Future?” February
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Businesses: While business organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce oppose the

expansion of the sale of prison-made goods in open markets, some companies favor
present arrangements because they profit from the use of inmate labor or sell supplies and
materials to prison industries.
Industry critics of the FPI program argue that UNICOR’s failure to honor the
program’s safeguards against unfair competition damages private businesses. Moreover,
these critics argue, the mandatory sourcing requirement causes UNICOR to be a
monopoly which produces poor quality products and service at inflated prices. For
example, Michael Gale, Director of Government Relations for the Apparel Manufacturers
Association alleged:
UNICOR steals jobs from…hardworking law-abiding, tax-paying citizens…We estimate
that over the years, 7,000 private sector apparel workers have lost their jobs because of
UNICOR’s continued and unchecked expansion of apparel manufacturing…The
[Defense Personnel Supply Command (DPSC)] estimates that it pays, on average, 15%
more than the lowest private sector bid on almost 100% of what it buys from
UNICOR…[I]n fiscal year 1995, UNICOR was delinquent in 46% of its contracts with
DPSC. In…1996 UNICOR was delinquent in 36% of its contracts. For both years the
private sector was delinquent in only 9% of its contracts.”21

Gale reported that a 1991 “Deloitte and Touche study indicates that UNICOR receives
poor quality ratings from its customers.”22
There are similar complaints about state prison industry products. According to a
1994 Forbes article on the California Prison Industry Authority (PIA),
state agencies are required to give [PIA] first crack at supplying goods, regardless of
price or quality…

A private furniture manufacturer offered to deliver…chairs [to California State
Polytechnic University] within six weeks for $54 apiece. But Cal Poly was obliged to buy
[PIA’s] chairs for $92 each. Eight months after the orders were placed, 54 of the 213
chairs have yet to be delivered…
“[PIA’s] cost is always higher [than private suppliers’],” fumes Jerry Schroeder, a Cal.
Dept. of Motor Vehicles purchasing officer. “Not sometimes—always.”23

Inmate Advocates: Other critics allege that during the 1980s and ‘90s a combination of

“get tough on criminals” policies and the expansion of industrial employment has led to
the exploitation of inmates, who are powerless to protect themselves except through
litigation, which is expensive, time consuming and uncertain. “Get tough” policies have
contributed greatly to a prison population explosion, sharply increasing prison costs (a
commonly cited figure is $20,000-$25,0000 annual cost per prisoner), thus exerting great
pressure to expand ILFP as a way to offset part of the added cost. These developments
also enable corrections institutions to charge prisoners for court costs, the compensation
21

House hearing, op cit., pp. 102, 106.

22

Ibid., p. 116.

23

Nina Munk, Forbes, August 29, 1984, p. 82.

9

of victims, room and board, and medical care. These charges put great pressure on
inmates to work but also limit their net compensation. As noted earlier, the AFL-CIO
contends that the pressures to work limit the education and training needed for
rehabilitation.
Industrial work by prisoners is voluntary, but inmates allege that a refusal to work
often leads to abuse by prison officials. Moreover, all able-bodied prisoners are required
to work, but are compensated much better for industrial than for institutional
employment. These conditions cause some, especially the AFL-CIO, to believe that the
United States is vulnerable to the charge that our prison labor polices are in violation of
ILO Convention 105 on forced labor.24
Arguments For and Against Relaxing Restrictions
Those who favor relaxing the restrictions on the employment of inmates make a
number of arguments:
1) The expansion of paid employment would benefit inmates, their families, their
victims, corrections institutions and the general public.
2) Under present arrangements, inmates and their families suffer because they are
locked into self-perpetuating cycles of poverty and crime. According to one assessment,
“…there are seven million children with a parent in jail or prison or recently released on
probation or parole.”25 Having a parent behind bars, according to this report, puts children
in much greater risk of a life of delinquency and crime. Indeed, this link is so strong that
half of all juveniles in custody have a parent or close relative who has been in jail or
prison. And 40 percent of the 1.8 million adult inmates have a parent or sibling behind
bars.26 Expanding paid employment, proponents argue, would provide marketable skills
for inmates, income for them and their families, reduce recidivism and thus do much to
break these self-generating and intergenerational cycles of poverty.
Perhaps the best evidence on the relationship between prison industries work and
recidivism is from the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Post-Release Employment Project
(PREP), a seven-year research and evaluation study published in 1991 and updated in
1996. This study compared inmates who worked in prison industries with those with
similar backgrounds who did not participate in FPI work or receive vocational training.
This study found that relative to releasees who were not involved in prison industries
while incarcerated, FPI inmates demonstrated better institutional adjustment while in
prison, were less likely to recidivate, had higher earnings and were more likely to be
employed. The 1996 update tracked the same inmates for up to 12 years after release
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“and concluded that FPI inmates had a 20% greater chance of obtaining employment,
earning higher salaries upon release…and remaining crime free.”27
In their 1997 study of PREP enrollees, William Saylor and Gerald Gaes found
that participants had a recidivism rate of 6.6% compared with an overall federal inmate
rate of 20% and 10.1% for a comparison group.28
Less controlled evidence on the relationship between recidivism and state prison
industries employment comes from the Enterprise Prison Institute (EPI), “a private
research and education organization focused on the management of our prison and
criminal justice systems.”29 EPI summarized general data from a number of states,
including PRIDE, which compared 2,068 inmates who had worked for PRIDE for six
months or more (between 1990 and 1994) before their release in 1995 with state prisoners
who did not work for PRIDE. Two years after their release 11% of the PRIDE
participants had returned to prison compared with 27% for non-PRIDE releasees.
According to a 1998 PRIDE report, “of the 560 ex-offenders who had worked for
PRIDE for six months or more in fiscal year 1995, seventy-one or 12.7% recommitted
within a two-year period.”30 This compared with a Florida inmate recidivism rate of
18.8% for FY 1994-95, the most recent year for which data are available. There has,
however, been no attempt to compare PRIDE enrollees with similar non-enrollee
inmates. Such a comparison would provide a better assessment of PRIDE’s impact.
A somewhat more controlled study of Ohio Prison Industries (OPI) compared 744
releasees in 1992 who had worked for OPI at least 90 days with 7,839 non-OPI releasees
who met the basic requirements for participation in OPI. Overall, the OPI participants
recidivated 18 percent less—24.6% compared with 29.9% for non-OPI inmates. The
skilled OPI releasees had a recidivism rate of 15%, about half that of the control group.
Blacks with OPI experience recidivated at 26.8 percent compared with 36.5% for
non-OPI blacks, a much greater impact than the comparable rates for whites, which were
22.3% and 23.1%.31
3) More paid work would enable prisoners to make restitution for their crimes.
Once incarcerated, offenders have no way to make restitution or to support themselves or
their families. As former Chief Justice Warren Burger put it: “To put people behind walls
and bars and do little or nothing to change them is to win a battle but lose the war. It is
wrong. It is expensive. It is stupid.”32
4) More private sector work might do much to improve the culture of correction
institutions by relieving the tensions created by boredom and idleness, instilling a work
ethic in prisoners, and helping defray the high and rising costs of incarceration.
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Moreover, subjecting prison industries to the discipline of competitive markets might
greatly improve the efficiency of prison industry and, depending on competitive
strategies, the value of the training inmates receive. Market discipline might do much to
change the prison culture, which many experts consider more to train inmates to be
criminals than to rehabilitate them. According to this view, prison bureaucracies are
self-perpetuating institutions concerned mainly with incarceration, not rehabilitation. It is
conceivable that greater private employment, with proper safeguards, could cause prisons
to be more concerned with better classifications and groupings of inmates. There can be
little doubt that removing mandatory sourcing requirements and subjecting prison
industries to competition would cause them to become less complacent and more
efficient.
What Kinds of Policies Might Accomplish These Outcomes?
Removing or offsetting unjustified competitive advantages and disadvantages
between free market and prison industries also might facilitate expansion of industrial
employment by reducing opposition to ILFP expansion. It is not clear what would be
required to achieve this objective. For example, many, including Vice President Gore’s
National Performance Review, recommend eliminating the mandatory sourcing
requirement for FPI. By contrast, FPI officials argue that eliminating mandatory sourcing
would destroy prison industries which, they argue, must have this requirement in order to
attract private partners and offset the economic disadvantages they suffer because of
prison security conditions and the low quality of prison labor.
However, conceivably prison industries could compensate for these disadvantages
by deductions from inmates’ earnings, as is done now, and by using public revenues for
education, training and other services to inmates. Because of the social returns to human
capital formation, it is in the national interest to remove the financial barriers to education
and training for all workers in and out of prison. These human capital services might, in
effect, be subsidies to prison industry, as well as investments in the rehabilitation of
inmates.
Competition also might be improved by requiring prison industries to observe the
same labor standards—including the right to unionize—as their private sector
competitors.
Some insight into the efficacy of procedures to balance compensation between
inmates and free workers might be found in the U.S. experience with adverse effect wage
rates (AEWR) for temporary foreign workers and prevailing wages for government
contractors. The basic purpose of the AEWR is to prevent the employment of foreign
workers from depressing domestic working conditions. Similarly, prevailing wage laws
are supposed to prevent governments from using their economic power to depress labor
standards. The application of prevailing and minimum wage requirements to prison
industry could require these industries to compete by becoming more efficient rather than
through lower labor standards. Some argue that prison industries cannot compete if they
have to pay prevailing wages (from which prison officials could make deductions), but
there is evidence from the PIE program that at least some private companies can compete
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while paying prevailing wages, though how much PIE companies evade this requirement
is not clear.
Another area that should be explored is the application of anti-discrimination
policies and concepts to ex-offenders. These policies, like other labor standards, are
justified as needed to cause labor market decisions to be based on productivity and merit
instead of race, gender, age or other factors. This is a complex, controversial and
important subject which would require careful study and debate, but we have a wealth of
experience with anti-discrimination policies in other areas. To be useful for policy, a
theory of discrimination should define discrimination and assess its impact on various
actors, as well as explain why it occurs and how it changes.33 There can be little doubt
that ex-offenders have employment problems related to a combination of discrimination
and legitimate labor market factors, which would have to be sorted out. An effective
rehabilitation program would include measures to overcome human capital (education,
training, health and motivation) disadvantages. It could be that anti-discrimination
measures would cause human capital programs to be more effective.
Lessons from anti-discrimination policies in other areas that might be useful in
developing such policies for ex-offenders include:
1) A careful understanding of the nature, meaning and relative importance of economic
discrimination (ED). Some basic principles are applicable in all cases:
a) ED is caused by a combination of status and economic advantage for the
discriminators; status, because people discriminated against have identifiable
characteristics which cause victims to be considered inferior by discriminators..
b) ED varies in intensity between different groups of victims.
c) ED is difficult to identify and measure because it is part of a complex
constellation of factors that cause victims to be disadvantaged.
d) It is important to distinguish institutionalized forms of discrimination from
specific overt acts that can be proved in courts or administrative processes.
Different policies are required to counteract institutional and overt ED.
e) Discrimination is an action while prejudice is an attitude, which may or may not
lead to discrimination depending upon the power relationships between actors.
Through cognitive dissonance in economic relationships, attitudes are more likely
to flow from actions than actions are from attitudes.
There seems to be little doubt that some ED stems from misperceptions about the
corrigibility of ex-offenders. These misperceptions might be overcome by better
classifications of inmates based on profiles of the degrees of risk, public information
campaigns and demonstrations of successful rehabilitation. Anti-discrimination
demonstrations might start with private prison industry and government contractors, as
was the case with race, gender and other forms of ED. There is little doubt in my mind
that discrimination against ex-offenders is a barrier to their rehabilitation and
reintegration into society or that the elimination of such discrimination would be in the
Ray Marshall, “The Economics of Racial Discrimination: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature 12,
No. 3, September 1974; Ray Marshall, “Civil Rights and Social Equity: Beyond Neoclassical Theory,” in
New Directions in Civil Rights Studies, Armstead L. Robinson and Patricia Sullivan (eds.) (Charlottesville,
Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1991), pp. 149-174.
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public interest. But I would need more information than I have to assess the importance
of discrimination relative to human capital factors and to specify how an ex-offender
anti-discrimination policy might work. The clearest and least controversial case would be
to outlaw discrimination by private prison industries and government contractors. Some
incentives (competitive advantage) might be given to non-discriminatory employers.
The unionization of inmates might have several advantages. For one thing, an
effective alternative dispute resolution process could reduce the cost of litigation by
inmates, which some consider mainly trivial and very expensive for the states.34 Unions
also could become advocates for inmates within the prisons and perhaps accelerate prison
reform. There is little doubt that prisoners need effective alternatives to the courts, which
are expensive, uncertain and time consuming. Unions also could strengthen the
enforcement of existing laws, supplementing the limited enforcement resources available
to federal agencies. My limited investigations for this paper found numerous allegations
of evasion of labor and private industry protections by prison industries.
Unions could, in addition, help with the rehabilitation process by providing skill
development, especially through apprenticeship training, which would improve inmate
earnings while in prison and after their release. Prototype programs have been created in
Iowa and other places. Training in registered apprentice programs provide geographic
and occupational mobility, as well as higher wages and the efficient acquisition of skills.
A system that permitted private industry to bid for the right to operate prison
industries could increase efficiency and provide more paid jobs for inmates. Special
attention might be given to targeting industries most likely to migrate out of the United
States. An independent board representative of all stakeholders could accept bids from a
variety of organizations, including those that already operate prison industries. The bid
notices could specify the conditions necessary to protect and promote the interests of
inmates, businesses, prison functions and the public. Along with the usual business
qualifications, bid specifications should include labor standards, security requirements
and other matters to facilitate inmate rehabilitation. For example, because education and
training are so important to rehabilitation, special preference might be given to
companies that provide effective training and post-release placement and support services
for inmates. A prototype for at least some components of this activity could be the
PRIDE Enterprises, a nonprofit conglomerate of private sector businesses created by the
Florida legislature in 1981 to reduce the cost of state government and to achieve
rehabilitative goals by “duplicating as nearly as possible the operating activities of a
free-enterprise type of profit-making enterprise.” In FY 1998 PRIDE’s sales were $81.2
million and it employed 4,890 inmates for 4,321,548 hours.35 PRIDE also provides
structured on-the-job training and education benefits, as well as post-release job
placement, education assistance and support (over half of PRIDE’s inmate workers are
placed “directly to the community and available for work”). 36
34
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A more detailed formal evaluation might show whether or not PRIDE is a suitable
model for replication. While PRIDE apparently has some strong features, it is not clear
that workers’ interests are adequately protected, as suggested by the AFL-CIO’s
complaints noted earlier. It is equally questionable that a state-created monopoly is the
most effective way to manage prison industries. With appropriate safeguards, a more
competitive model might greatly improve education, training and inmate rehabilitation.
Such a system also might provide greater incentives for inmates to improve their job
skills and earnings.
2) More balanced competition is necessary but not sufficient to make significant
improvements in prisons and the development of opportunities for inmates and their
families. Rewards for the acquisition of work skills and knowledge as well as work
performance could be a valuable component of a more effective rehabilitation system.
Although there are unlikely to be enough industrial jobs for all inmates, an expanded
work program could facilitate better classification and separation of workers (in terms of
their probability for successful rehabilitation) from those who need closer supervision.
Grouping inmates might create better peer pressure for successful work careers rather
than for criminal activities.
A careful analysis of recidivism in Texas and elsewhere demonstrates that “since
recidivism is caused by a complex constellation of factors it is unlikely that any single
factor intervention strategy would be successful.”37 While employment is necessary for
the successful reintegration of ex-offenders, it is not sufficient; other factors include
counseling, education and training, drug treatment, and post-release support and
placement services. Since an estimated three-fourths of inmates are considered to be
functionally illiterate,38 education is a much better way to occupy inmates’ time than the
make work and idleness that is characteristic of many prisons.39 The labor standards for
prison industries, including institutional occupations performed by inmates, could
therefore ensure a proper balance between work, education, and rehabilitative counseling.
There is strong evidence that marginal low-wage work alone will not do much to
improve the earnings of inmates or anyone else.40 Real improvements depend on the
acquisition of a strong work ethic and marketable skills. The best skill development
programs are those like registered apprenticeships that combine the simultaneous
development of standards-based knowledge with manual skills. Such a program for
inmates has been developed by the Iowa Department of Corrections Prison Industries
Division and the South Central Iowa Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO’s Labor Institute for
Economic Development. This is a registered apprenticeship program in established prison
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industries in three of Iowa’s correctional facilities. The first three programs were in
machine tooling, printing and graphic design. The union takes responsibility for placing
successful graduates through its hiring hall. According to South Central Iowa’s AFL-CIO
president, “It’s our duty and our job to represent [prison inmate apprentices] in the job
market.”41 Debate on the issue at union meetings transformed rejection of ex-offenders to
acceptance of fellow union members who have successfully served apprenticeships
highly valued by union members.
A number of states have developed what appear to be effective job training
programs for inmates. In 1993, for example, Oklahoma had 570 inmates enrolled in skill
training classes. The Oklahoma program is different from those of most states in that it is
operated by the Oklahoma Department of Vocational and Technical Education instead of
the Department of Corrections. All instructors and administrators are employed by the
state vo-tech department. It would be interesting to examine Oklahoma’s experiences in
depth to determine whether or not a non-corrections education and training staff could be
more effective, or how much it might affect the traditional prison culture. According to a
1993 report, the Oklahoma program, initiated by a state senator in 1970, had been
beneficial to both the corrections and vo-tech departments. The most significant benefit
of this arrangement was to ensure the “program’s focus on education. Programs operated
by corrections officials often tend to be measured in terms of their ability to address
idleness, security issues and the institutions’ maintenance needs.”42 The Oklahoma
arrangement also has greatly enhanced student-teacher bonding and provides inmates
access to state-of-the-art equipment that legislators often are unwilling to provide to
corrections institutions. Their commitment to their program was sufficiently strong that
student inmates protected the training facility during a riot in one of Oklahoma’s prisons.
Students who enroll in the program receive an occupational plan for training in a
variety of trades and occupations lasting from 18 to 32 weeks. Job placement is a major
problem in the reintegration of ex-offenders into society. Oklahoma finds placement to be
a challenge, but provides job placement specialists to help inmates who complete the
program. It was reported in 1993 that 70 percent of all minimum security graduates are
placed within 90 days of their release. Reviews in Maryland, Oklahoma and Illinois have
found that inmates’ performance in vo-tech programs is comparable to that of similar
non-inmate students and that inmates who complete these programs recidivate at lower
rates than other students.43 In 1999, Oklahoma’s vo-tech department operated three
registered apprenticeship programs (meat processing, welding and food services). In
April 1999, the department’s acting director told me that they had no trouble placing
certified apprentice graduate releasees.
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Conclusions
With this background, I can provide tentative answers to the questions posed for
this project:
1. I believe the recommendations I have made could permit the expansion of ILFP
to be good for most stakeholders. The main losers would be those companies that cannot,
or do not wish to, compete on a level playing field. It remains to be seen, of course,
whether private companies will be willing to hire inmates under the conditions I propose.
However, I believe it possible to adjust prison programs and the inmate wage deduction
system to make prison labor attractive to good employers, especially if employers, along
with unions and other stakeholders, are involved in negotiating the actual terms of
employment. And provided further that tight labor markets and the targeting of
appropriate prison industries create incentives for companies to use inmate labor while
protecting low wage workers in the private sector from surges in supplies of prison-made
products. Inmates, their families and victims, and prison systems would all benefit from
expanded paid employment. Unions could be major beneficiaries if they are given a
larger role and are able to make themselves attractive to inmate workers. An expansion of
employment is unlikely to be large enough to offset the high cost of incarceration, but it
could greatly improve rehabilitation and free up resources for other prison activities. The
reduced recidivism rate might moderate the rise in prison populations, but alternatives to
incarceration for non-violent offenders also could relieve the pressures on prisons. Above
all, these changes might make better use of prisoners’ time for work, education, and
training than the debilitating and dangerous idleness which seems to be the norm now.
2. I believe the key steps in improving the economic contribution of the inmate
labor force are: expand paid employment within the framework of balanced
competition and protective labor standards, strengthen employment and
training, and promote the more effective reintegration of ex-offenders into the
work force. In order to sell these recommendations to the public and to policy
makers, we need to collect better evidence about what works and why in each
of these processes. This could be done by more detailed research, followed by
carefully designed pilot projects.
Panel Remarks
In addition to his presentation, Ray Marshall also provided comment to panelists, extending the
detail of his views on inmate labor force participation. A fuller sense of his views includes
understanding both the remarks and questions of the panelists and his responses to panelists. His
full responses, minimally edited, to the following panelists on the following issues can be found
below in the chapter presenting the panel:
Panelist

Response Subjects

Harry Holzer

Minimum Wages and Wage Setting
Labor Union and Labor Representation

Linda Haithcox

Inmate Participation in Deliberations
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Role of Mediation
Wendell Primus

Role of Measurement and Rewards
International Labor Standards for Voluntary Labor

Steve Schwalb

Effects on Prison Culture
Choosing Appropriate Prison Industries

Brenda Smith

Understanding Employment Effects on Female Inmates

Charles Sullivan

Education and Skill Development (Two part response, including to
moderator’s follow-up question)
Computers and Technology Skills Building

Greg Woodhead

Unionization
Publicly Funded Inmate Jobs

The Economics of Inmate Labor Force Participation
May 21, 1999
The George Washington University
The Center on Crime, Communities & Culture of The Open Society Institute
Chapter 3
Presentation by Richard Freeman
Making the Most From Inmate Labor
Biography
Professor Richard B. Freeman holds the Ascherman Chair of Economics at Harvard University.
He is currently serving as Faculty Co-chair of the Harvard University Trade Union Program.
Professor Freeman is Program Director of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Program
in Labor Studies. He is also Co-director of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London
School of Economics and Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics.
Professor Freeman is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has served
on five panels of the National Academy of Science: high-risk youth; post secondary education
and training in the workplace; employment and technical change; demographic and economic
impacts of immigration; and national needs for biomedical and behavioral sciences.
Professor Freeman received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1969. Before returning to
Harvard in 1975, he taught at the University of Chicago and Yale University.
Professor Freeman has published over 250 articles dealing with topics in youth labor market
problems, crime, higher education, trade unionism, transitional economies, high skilled labor
markets, economic discrimination, social mobility, income distribution, and equity in the
marketplace. In addition, he has written or edited 21 books, several of which have been
translated into French, Spanish, Chinese, and Japanese. Some of his recent books include Labor
Market Institutions and Economic Success (1999), What Workers Want? (1999), Generating
Jobs: How to Increase Demand for Less-Skilled Workers ( 1998), and Differences and Changes
in Wage Structures ( 1995).
Presentation
Many prisoners work within prisons producing goods and services to maintain
correctional facilities, reducing the costs to taxpayers of maintaining prisoners and gaining some

work skills. A much smaller number work in traditional correctional industry activities, such as
for the Federal Prisons. The ABA Subcommittee on Correctional Industries estimated that total
employment of prisoners in 1997 in traditional correctional industries amounted to about 75,000
in a workforce of over 136 million persons, while just 2,400 prisoners worked for private sector
industries (ABA, figure 3). Federal Prison Industries, UNICOR, employs about 17,000 inmates.
With nearly 2 million inmates in 1999 the majority of whom are in state and federal prisons
where inmate work could be most readily increased, there is considerable potential scope for
increasing the work activity of prisoners.
What are the likely economic consequences of an increase in the amount of work
prisoners do for the market outside of prisons? Who would benefit? Who would lose? What
would be the most efficacious way to increase the work activity of prisoners?
This short comment seeks to answer these questions. The main theme is that the effects
of increased prisoner work activity on the economy depends on three critical economic
parameters:
the impact of prison labor on the wages/employment of competing labor;
the effect of wages and employment on the criminal behavior of competing labor
the effect of prison labor in reducing recidivism by prisoners.
The starting point for this analysis is the simple economic principle that if prison labor
produces goods that reduce the wages/employment of competing labor, those outside workers
suffer an economic loss. If this loss is small and those workers can find roughly comparable jobs
elsewhere, prison labor will increase national output. If, in addition, prison labor reduces
recidivism (or in some other way lowers crime) the economy will also benefit by being able to
shift resources to more productive activities. To the extent that prison labor makes prisons more
easy to manage, moreover, this will reduce the cost to taxpayers, and increase output. This is an
Ideal Prison Labor scenario.
But if increased prison work reduces substantially the economic well-being of
comparable non-prison labor if the workers competing with prisoners respond to lower wages/
employment losses by engaging in crime, prison labor will reduce output. This is a Horror
Prison Labor situation.
My calculations suggest that on net national output would increase if we increase prison
labor, but the range of estimates for the critical demand and supply parameters is sufficiently
wide to suggest that we cannot rule out either the Ideal Prison Labor or Horror Prison Labor
situations. Hence, I stress that we consider ways to structure the use of prison labor to produce
goods that bring the least harm to competing free labor and most reduce recidivism: that prison
labor produce import-competing commodities and employ prisoners with the greatest potential
for productive non-criminal careers outside of prison.
Underlying my analysis are two basic facts. First, that most prisoners are unskilled and
can make only a modest productive contribution to national output, so that their impact on the

national economy will be rather slight. Second, that crime and the criminal justice system are
sufficiently costly to society that effects of prison labor on crime must be a significant
component in any assessment of the economics of prison labor.
Prison labor as trade/immigration
I treat the effect of prison labor on the domestic economy from the perspective of the
economics of trade or immigration. In trade/immigration analysis an increase in imports due to
freer trade or increased competence of foreign labor or of immigrants from overseas raises
national output and lowers the earnings of competing domestic factors. From the perspective of
the free labor market, an increase in the work of prisoners is equivalent to an increase in
imports/immigration from some foreign country.
As a starting point, consider the effect of prison labor on the earnings/employment of
similarly skilled labor in the competitive market. Let S = A + e W be the supply curve of
workers of inmate quality, where S is the (log) supply, W is (log) wages. . Let D= B-ηW be the
demand curve for those workers, where D is the log of demand. The market clearing wage and
employment are W = (B-A)/(e + η) and E = (eB + ηA)/(e+η).
If an increase in the supply of inmates raises the supply of workers producing the relevant
products by I percent (ln points), this will drive down the wage by I/(e+η). Non-inmate
employment will fall by (e)/(e+h)[I] while inmate and non-inmate employment will rise by
η/(e+η) I. In total, there will be ηI/(e+η) extra workers, who will increase national output.
The benefit of prison inmate labor is the increase in output, which benefits all citizens. The cost
is the reduction in wages of competitors, which falls on a small number of close competitors.
Analysts of immigration distinguish between the gains to immigrants and the gains to
natives from increased immigration. In the case of prisoners, the issue is more complicated,
since the state can decide what proportion of prisoner marginal product goes to the prisoner, to
recompensing victims, or to covering the expenses of incarceration.
In any case, the more elastic is the demand for labor, the smaller will be the gains to the
country and the smaller the economic losses to competing labor from increased prison work.
The effect of the supply of competing labor on the analysis is more complicated. The more
elastic the supply of competing labor, the smaller will be the economic losses to them. If their
next best alternatives are legitimate ones, GDP will rise more, but if next best alternatives are
illegitimate ones, a high supply elasticity will show up in a large increase in crime. In this case
the effect of prison labor on national output may be negative.
The effects of inmate labor on crime
The analysis of prison labor diverges from the analysis of immigration and trade because
prison labor can affect criminal behavior, which has large costs on the society. Indeed, because
inmates are disproportionately less educated young men, with only modest productivity in

legitimate work, the economic effects of prison labor through its effect on criminal behavior may
dominate any benefit-cost assessment of prison labor. Some rough calculations make this clear.
Estimates of the ratio of output from prison industries to the number of prison workers by the
ABA show that prison labor is about 1/3rd as productive as the average member of the work
force: gross sales per inmate are around $20,000 while gross sales per employee in the national
economy are around $60,000 (ABA, figure 12).
The marginal productivity/earnings of inmates is likely to be in the area of the minimum
wage  say, $10-5,000 per year. The cost of incarceration is about $30,000 per year while the
social cost of a criminal is likely to be at least $30,000 per year. In addition, there are sizable
costs to administering the non-corrections part of the criminal justice system. These magnitudes
suggest that whatever increase in GDP we get from additional prison labor could be offset (or
worse) if it induced additional crime from the competing work force.
But, by the same argument, the biggest potential benefit from prison labor will be in
reducing recidivism and the costs of future crime. Assume that prison labor reduces recidivism
by 20%. Then for each year after the prisoner is released, society will gain .20 x 30,000 =
$6,000. Discounted at 10%, this gives a present value gain of some $60,000 (ignoring the finite
life correction term in the discounting).
How sizable is the likely effect of prison labor on the wages or employment of
non-prison workers?
There are no studies of this issue, so we have to rely on other information. On the one
side, minimum wage analyzes suggest that the elasticity of demand for low skill labor is rather
small, -0.10 is a typical value found in some studies. This would imply that an increase in prison
labor would have a huge effect on the wages/employment of competing workers. But on the
other side, analyzes of the effect of immigrants on employment/wages of natives find small
effects that imply a high elasticity of demand. If this were the case, an increase in prison labor
would have little effect on the wages/employment of competing workers. There is no simple
way to make these two differing estimates consistent.
How sizable is the supply responsiveness to crime of low skill workers, who would
compete with prison labor?
While there is a growing body of evidence that economic factors in the form of
unemployment and wages paid low skill workers affect crime, there is no professional consensus
about the elasticity of crime to wages (Freeman, 1999). There are estimates as large as 1.0 but
also estimates that suggest much smaller responsiveness. Most studies find that unemployment
increases crime, so if competing workers lost their jobs, there would likely be some increase in
crime, irrespective of the wage effects.
Given this imprecision, I shall simply take some plausible parameter values to
illustrate the forces at work. The reader can put in his or her own plausible values to see how

the results might vary. For my story, I assume that there are 1000 unskilled workers in the
economy and 100 inmates (this is a reasonable proportion for high school dropout young men). I
further assume that the supply elasticity of unskilled labor is 1 and the demand elasticity is also
1. In this case the market model predicts that the 10% increase in total supply due to inmates
working would reduce the employment of unskilled workers in the economy by 5%. In
equilibrium there will be 1050 workers in the sector, 100 inmates and 950 non-inmates. National
output in the sector would rise roughly by 50 x $15,000 or $750,000. The wage of the
competing workers would fall by 5%.
The key is what happens to the 50 non-inmates who have left the affected sector. If all of
these workers engage in crime and none found other productive work, the cost to the country
would be 50x $30,000 -- two times the gain! If the cost of crime is higher than $30,000 the cost
to the country is even larger. But the assumption that all of the non-inmates who leave the
affected sector engage in crime is extreme. If a quarter of the 50 non-inmates no longer working
entered crime and the others found some gainful work, national output would increase.
How sizable is the reduction in recidivism due to prisoners working while incarcerated?
Again, there is no firm widely accepted estimate, but at least one major study has found
that prison labor does indeed reduce recidivism (Saylor and Gaes, 1995). The reduction in
recidivism is about the same as the reduction due to providing job training to prisoners  about
20 percent. This implies that annually 20 of the 100 inmates would eschew crime for a gain of
20 x $30,000 or $600,000 to the economy. This gain is in the same ballpark as the estimated
increase in output in the affected sector from prison labor.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis directs attention at the following information, for us to assess the
economics of prison labor:
1) Elasticity of demand for the goods/labor with which prison-made goods compete
2) The next best alternatives for workers who compete with prison labor,
particularly the extent to which crime is an alternative, and thus the crime elasticity of low skill
workers to the job market.
3) The effect of prison labor on inmate recidivism

My quantitative calculations suggest that the effects of prison labor through crime 
increasing the crime among workers competing with prisoners or reducing recidivism among
inmates  are of comparable magnitude to the increased production from prison labor. An ideally
structured prison labor program thus would direct prison labor into areas that are as
non-competitive with domestic production as possible  towards producing goods that we
currently import  and would employ prisoners most likely to return to legitimate society and
make use of the skills they learn from prison labor. Finally, prison labor should be used more in
periods of economic boom, when the job/earnings opportunities for low skill workers are likely to
be high, than in periods of national recession. On net, I believe that the gains from reduced
recidivism and the gains to output probably exceed the cost of the additional crime that prison
production is likely to create. But my assessment depends on the magnitudes of effects, so I could
readily change given firm estimates of the relevant effects that differ greatly from those I use in this
comment.
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Panel Remarks
In addition to his presentation, Richard Freeman also provided comment to panelists, extending the
detail of his views on inmate labor force participation. A fuller sense of his views includes
understanding both the remarks and questions of the panelists and his responses to panelists. His
full responses, minimally edited, to the following panelists on the following issues can be found
below in the chapter presenting the panel:
Panelist

Response Subjects

Harry Holzer Reduced recidivism justifying inmate work subsidies
Wendell Primus

Requirements of firms hiring inmates
Wage and deduction setting to motivate inmates’ work

Steve Schwalb

Identifying appropriate foreign-made products for U.S.
Inmate manufacture

Charles Sullivan

Complications providing inmates computers for education

Gregory Woodhead

Education, treatment, and jobs policies for inmates vs public
policies for non-offenders

Thomas Petersik

Inmate participation in labor unions
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Presentation
The primary question we have been asked to address for this Symposium is:
Are bans on inmate labor force participation
‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the U.S. economy?
Our answer to this question, subject to qualifications discussed below, is that a ban on
prison labor is probably ‘bad’ for the economy in the narrow sense that it slightly reduces
the total output of goods and services in the domestic economy as officially measured by
figures for the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As the following calculation suggests,
however, the potential effect of permitting prison labor on GDP is likely to be quite
small. To derive an upper bound estimate of the effect of encouraging prison labor on
GDP, suppose that all inmates work full time, year round (i.e., 2,000 hours per year), and
produce output per hour equivalent to the minimum wage ($5.15). Under these
assumptions, inmate labor would produce $19 billion of output. In 1998, total GDP was
$8.5 trillion in the U.S., so the potential addition of inmate labor to GDP is only 0.2
percent of total U.S. GDP.1 This figure is less than the typical magnitude of “statistical
discrepancy” in the National Income Accounts; it is barely noticeable.
We should stress that our calculation probably provides a substantial overestimate
for several reasons. First, labor force participation of inmates is likely to be well under
100 percent even if employment of inmates is encouraged since relatively few inmates
work when they are not incarcerated. Second, the average inmate may produce less
output per hour than the minimum wage, especially once possible additional security
costs or prison modifications are taken into account.2 Third, prison industries already
1

1998 GDP is reported by the U.S. Commerce Department in “National Income and Product Accounts
Tables,” Survey of Current Business. The very small amount of output relative to the total in the U.S.
economy is the same point made by Rod Miller, Mary Shelton, and Tom Petersik, “Inmate Labor in
America’s Correctional Facilities: A Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association’s Subcommittee
on Correctional Industries,” Community Resource Services, April 1998.
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Inmates worked for wages that averaged 78 cents per hour in prison industries in 1997, so the
minimum wage may overstate the average productivity of inmates. This figure is derived from the ratio of
total inmate wages paid in 1997 (Miller et al.
, 1998, Figure 12) to total inmate labor hours (Correctional
Industries Association, 1998, p. 108).

produce goods worth about $1.6 billion, so time used to produce this output should be
deducted from total potential available hours.3 Finally, inmates already perform a great
deal of uncompensated general work assignments in and around prisons (e.g., cleaning
the facilities and preparing food) which are not included in GDP as far as we know, so
this time would also have to be deducted from potential available hours.4
Even if prison industries contribute a small amount to total output, they are not
necessarily ‘good’ for the economy. For example, in a traditional government-operated
industry, if extra security and supervision costs are required to create an environment that
permits work compared to the costs of maintaining an environment in which inmates are
not working, then these extra security costs might exceed the value of the output from the
industry. In this case where the industry is not profitable for the government, it should be
shut down even though some output was being produced, and total GDP raised.
A narrow focus on GDP is not very informative. We believe a more important
economic question to address is:
Is the economic value of the social benefits of inmate labor
greater than the total costs to society?
If the social costs outweigh the benefits, then the government should ban inmate labor.
Conversely, as long as the social benefits are greater than the costs, then the government
should encourage inmate labor. We believe it is critical to focus on social costs and
benefits and not on GDP, because many of the most economically significant aspects of
inmate labor are not captured by the dollar value of the goods produced by inmates.5
What do we mean by social benefits and costs? The answer is that policy-makers
need to estimate as well as possible the dollar value of the various consequences of
allowing inmate labor. Some of these values are easily observed, such as the wages that
private firms are willing to pay the laborers. Other values are less easily observed, but
verifiable in principle, such as the net change in the cost of security to the prison for
Gross sales are reported in: Correctional Industries Association. 1998 Directory: Producing
Productive People. Baltimore, Maryland: Correctional Industries Association, 1998; hereafter abbreviated
(CIA 1998).
3

4

A more accurate measure of GDP would include the value of the service performed by inmates
engaged in general work assignments. In principle, general work assignments in prison are services that
would require performance by at least some non-inmate workers if there were a ban on general work by
inmates. It appears to us that a ban on general work by inmates combined with performance of exactly the
same activities by non-inmate labor that received wages would increase measured GDP, but this is a flaw in
the measurement of GDP because the output of economic activity is unchanged regardless of whom
performs the work.
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This question essentially combines two of the four main questions we were asked to address. One
question was: “Are bans on inmate labor force participation ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the U.S. economy?”
Another question was: “If there are any criminal justice or correctional effects distinguishable from
economic aspects, please identify them -- particularly their effects on net social benefits and costs.”

inmates who are working in comparison to those who are not working. Still other values
are not directly verifiable, such as the cost of pain and suffering caused by different
numbers of crimes committed after release by inmates who engaged in inmate labor in
comparison to those who did not work as inmates; it is possible that permitting prison
labor could reduce subsequent crimes and recidivism because released prisoners who
have work experience fare better in the non-institutional economy. Despite the difficulty
of precisely quantifying these effects, it would be a mistake ignore these non-verifiable
values (implicitly assuming they are zero) so there have been many studies that try to
obtain rough estimates of these values. We specifically refer to “social” benefits and
costs because some consequences of inmate labor may affect society-at-large even
though they do not directly affect the inmate laborer or the employer. These benefits may
be realized at the time the labor takes place, or in the future. For example, if the
experience of inmate labor decreases criminal activity after release, then there would be
future benefits from the reduction of pain and suffering associated with crime. These
benefits should be discounted to present values.
In the context of the decision about whether to allow inmate labor, the decision is
much easier if the government allows private employers to bid for the services of the
inmate labor, provided that the bidders bear any changes in security costs. When the
government is not the employer of labor and producer of the goods, it requires much less
information because it does not need to know the details about the profitability of the
specific product to be made in order to make decisions about allowing inmate labor.
Even when the employer is a private firm, the government still needs to assess whether
there are important social benefits and costs beyond those taken into account by the
employer (in its decisions about the production of goods and the number and wages of
inmate laborers) that suggest whether the production should be subsidized or taxed
because of the government’s interest in other consequences of the employment of inmate
labor.
We have identified two types of social consequences from inmate labor. (1).
Partial equilibrium consequences can be thought of as due to one small enterprise that
would not have been undertaken if inmate labor were not available. (2). General
equilibrium consequences may occur if there were many enterprises using inmate labor,
cumulatively large enough to affect the product and labor markets in which they compete.
We believe the most important partial equilibrium social benefits are crime
reduction, earnings by inmate laborers, and security cost reductions, which are discussed
below.
Possible reduction in the number of crimes committed by offenders after release.
Research suggests that offenders commit 12-15 crimes per year after release, which have
a large economic cost to society.6 There is some evidence that participation in inmate
6

For example, see Steven Levitt, “The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence
from Prison Overcrowding Legislation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,1996, 319-251.

labor provides skills and experience that help former prisoners to forgo crime. For
example, the recidivism rate appears to be 3-8% lower for former inmate laborers than
for those with similar characteristics who were not inmate laborers.7 The economic value
of this crime reduction could be quite substantial. For example, if just five percent of
released prisoners were induced to commit no crimes after being released, compared to a
situation in which they would commit an average level of crime (say, costing $35,000 in
the first year after release and gradually declining to zero after fifteen years), the net
present value that could be saved over the 15 year period would be about $11,000 per
released inmate.8 Moreover, if five percent of released prisoners avoided a two-year
prison term after participating in inmate labor, the present value of future incarceration
costs would be reduced by about $2,800 per released inmate.9
It may also be true, however, that this relationship is not causal and that those
who choose to participate in inmate labor would have had a lower propensity to engage in
criminal activity even if they had not worked. Further study of this recidivism issue
should be a high priority. If there were a waiting list of inmates who wanted to work,
then a random lottery for participation would be both equitable and facilitate study of the
issue since the group not chosen in the lottery would be a natural control group.
Alternatively, the opportunity for inmate labor could be made available at some prisons,
and researchers could compare the experiences of these inmates to that at otherwise
similar prisons.
Wages paid to inmate labor. Benefits accrue to inmates, who have saving to draw
upon after release, and to their dependents in the form of support payments. Transfers
can also be made to victim compensation programs and to the government through taxes
and payments for room and board. In the past two decades, prison industry enhancement
programs have been operating in which $84 million dollars were paid in wages, of which
7

A study of the federal PREP program (for work experience, vocational and apprenticeship training)
found that participants had a recidivism rate of 6.6%, in comparison to 10.1% for comparison group with
similar demographics and criminal history (and 20% overall rate for all prison inmates). See William
Saylor and Gerald Gaes, “Training Inmates,” Corrections Management Quarterly, 1:2, 1997, 32-43. See
also: Stephen Anderson. Evaluation of the Impact of Participation in Ohio Penal Industries on Recidivism.
Columbus, OH: Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 1995. Comparisons were made
between inmates with similar reading scores at admission who did and did not later participate in Ohio
Penal Industries (OPI) work. For inmates ages 26-30 (22% of the sample) the recidivism rate was 22% for
the OPI group and 30% for the non-OPI group. For ages 31-40 (29% of the sample) the recidivism rate
was 24% for the OPI group and 29% for the non-OPI group. For other ages, the recidivism rates appear to
be similar.
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The dollar value estimate of $35,000 per year is conservative in the sense that it is somewhat lower
than the $43,100 estimate of the average dollar value of the cost of crimes excluding murder committed by
released inmates from Levitt (1996). This illustrative calculation assumes straightline depreciation in the
dollar value of crime over 15 years, and a discount rate of four percent.
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For this calculation, the annual cost of incarceration is assumed to be $30,000. (See Levitt 1996 for
citations to estimates ranging from $23,500 to $35,000). Five percent of prisoners are assumed to be
released for one year, and then in prison for two years, with a four percent discount rate.

8% were contributed to victims programs, 6% to family support deductions, 12% to
withheld taxes, and 22% to room and board.10 There may also be an increase in
employment and earnings in the legitimate labor market after release that would have
many of the same benefits, as suggested by research on offenders released from federal
prisons.11 As suggested above, further study to determine the causal effect of inmate
work programs on later outcomes is a high priority for future research.
Possible reduced security provision by prisons for inmate laborers. Employing
firms may have to provide special security when inmates are working. Another aspect of
the security issue, however, is that the operating costs of corrections facilities could be
lower when firms are occupying 6-8 hours per day of inmates time. Furthermore, even
when inmates are not at work, their morale and behavior may have improved so that the
costs of security are reduced, as suggested by research in New York.12 The quantitative
magnitude of costs savings from this reduced need for security have yet to be assessed.
In partial equilibrium, we do not believe there are important social costs. The real
question for the viability of small enterprises in a partial equilibrium analysis is whether
enough private firms will choose to employ inmate labor at prevailing wages. The
combination of paying prevailing wages for low skills with extra security costs in the
workplace may not be attractive to employers relative to alternatives. The social benefits
provided from reduced crime, redistribution of inmate wages, and reduced prison security
costs suggest that there could be under-provision of inmate employment and that society
could be better off if the government provides a subsidy to employment.13
We believe the most important general equilibrium social benefit in the long run
is the efficiency of production. Benefits accrue to consumers in the form of lower prices
and to employing firms who have a larger supply of less-skilled labor willing to work at
10

CIA 1998, p. 99.
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Saylor and Gaes (1997) find that PREP program participants had an employment rate of 72% one year
after release while non-participating inmates with similar background characteristics had an employment
rate of 63%.
Kathleen Maguire, “Prison industry programs and inmate institutional behaviour.” Forum on
Corrections Research8:1, 1996. The study compares inmates above the 80thpercentile in their number of
institutional infractions prior to participating in inmate labor to a sample of inmates with a similar number
of infractions during that time period. In a follow-up, the group that participated in inmate labor had
incurred 3.3 infractions while working and those who did not work incurred 5.0 infractions. While the
results for this high infraction subgroup were statistically significant, there were not significant changes for
those with a lower number of infractions prior to the inmate labor experience.
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One type of subsidy that may be feasible here is a simple wage subsidy. In general, the wage subsidy
is thought to be an unattractive policy instrument because it can be easily extorted by an employer who
reports fraudulently low hours and a high wage -- since usually information on hours is difficult to verify.
In the case of inmate labor, there is directly accounting for the time the inmate spends with the employer,
so this usual issue can be resolved.

low wages. As pointed out earlier, however, the effect of permitting prison labor on the
overall economy is likely to be quite small.
It is also our opinion that there are important potential social and distributional
costs from encouraging prison labor, due to an outward labor supply shift of (mainly)
unskilled inmate workers that will have consequences for less-skilled civilian workers.14
The first two columns of the following table compare the education distribution of the jail
and prison inmates to the general population in 1991. Inmates are 2.4 times more likely
to lack a high school diploma or GED than are those in the non-institutional U.S.
population.15 In the third column, we use the education distribution of inmates in 1991 to
infer the education levels of the 1.72 million men in jail or prison in 1998, and then report
the ratio of the number of inmates at each education level relative to the number of men
in the civilian labor force in the same education category.16 These figures provide an
indication of the potential magnitude of the labor supply shift due to prison labor by
education class. Clearly, because so many inmates have a low level of education, the
supply shift due to permitting prison labor will be greatest for the least skilled
non-institutional workers.
Education Distribution Inmates as a Proportion of the
Inmates
Population Civilian Male Labor Force, 1998
Less than High School Graduate
GED or High School graduate
At least some college

.47
.38
.16

.21
.36
.43

.105
.033
.008

We estimate that if inmates join the labor force, the number of high school
dropouts in the labor force will expand by 10.5 percent. In the long run, this increase in
supply will probably have a greater effect on wages for less-educated workers in the
non-institutional workforce, than on their employment (except, of course, for those who
voluntarily chose to withdraw from the workforce because of the decline in wages). If
the labor demand elasticity for this group of workers is -0.5, then wages could fall by as
much as 5 percent for workers with less than a high school degree if all prisoners join the
workforce.17 This is an upper bound for several reasons: (1) the relevant labor market
14

Our discussion of this social cost addresses one of the questions posed to us for this symposium:
“Will expanded inmate participation in the economy create, destroy, or have no effect on civilian
employment in the United States?”
U.S. Department of Justice. Profile of Inmates in the United States, England, and Wales, 1991.
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1994 (NCJ-145863).
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The number of prison and jail inmates by sex is reported in: U.S. Department of Justice. Prison and
Jail Inmates at Mid-year 1998. Washington D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999 (NCJ 173414). The
number in the civilian male labor force by education is reported in: U.S. Department of Labor.
Employment and Earnings. Washington D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 1999, p. 174.
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An elasticity of –0.5 for total labor demand was the median estimate in a survey of 65 labor
economists. See Table 2 of Victor Fuchs, Alan Krueger and James Poterba, “Economists’ Views about
Parameters, Values, and Policies: Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics,” Journal of Economic

also includes women; (2) inmates probably have less skill than non-institutional workers
with the same level of education; (3) only a proportion of inmates will work; (4) some
fraction of civilian workers may chose to withdraw from the labor force rather take a job
that pays 5 percent less; (5) the minimum wage provides a floor below which wages
cannot fall in many companies. Despite these caveats, this back-of-the-envelope
calculation provides a rough estimate of the potential impact of prison labor on the
less-skilled non-institutional labor force. Moreover, if civilian workers who withdraw
from the formal labor market because of deteriorating wages are pushed into a life of
crime, the social costs could be substantial.
Overall, however, despite the large increase in incarceration in the U.S., inmates
still would be a small fraction of the labor force even if many of them were working.
While the proportion of the population in prison or jail has doubled since 1985, the
number of adult men in prison or jail equaled 2.3 percent of the number in the male labor
force.18 For workers with some college, that ratio is under 1 percent. The 1998 overall
employmenttopopulation rate is predicted to be 70.6 percent had the prison population
been included in the estimates, compared to the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimate of
70.9 percent for the non-institutional population in the hypothetical situation in which all
incarcerated individuals were added to the civilian, non-institutional population, and 35
percent were employed.19
In assessing the economic value of the social costs and benefits, the government
also must consider the distributional consequences. In this case, the less-skilled labor
adversely affected by the presence of inmate labor may also as a group be the recipient of
some of the social benefits. The reason for this is that they are the same group that is
most likely to benefit from any reduction in criminal victimization resulting if
participation in inmate labor programs lowers criminal activity after release. Some
members of this group will also benefit from the family support payments made by
inmate laborers. A concrete recommendation about the decision the government should
Literature, 56 (September 1998), 1387-1425.
U.S. Department of Justice. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1997. Washington, DC:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998 (NCJ 171147).
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This analysis is based on Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger, “The High Pressure U.S. Labor Market of
the 1990s,” forthcoming Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1999. The original analysis considered
what would have happened to employment if inmates had been released. Here we consider the implications
of including inmate laborers in the labor force statistics. We focus on men because about 90 percent of
those in prison or jail are men. Administrative earnings data collected by the California Employment
Development Department show that 35 percent of individuals who served 12 year sentences in California
for federal crimes were employed prior to being arrested. This figure is similar to the employment rate
those convicted but not sentenced to prison time, two years after their case was filed. Consequently, we
assume that 35 percent of those in prison or jail would be working if given the opportunity. See Jeffrey
Kling, “The Effect of Prison Sentence Length on the Subsequent Employment and Earnings of Federal
Criminal Defendants,” Woodrow Wilson School Economics Discussion Paper 208, January 1999. For
U.S. employment and population figures, see the Bureau of Labor Statistics website at www.bls.gov.

make would be based on the magnitude of these costs and benefits, and a social welfare
function that places weights on the welfare of the various distributional groups. It would
also be important to investigate the relative cost effectiveness of alternatives such as
education and training for prisoners, which could in principle provide some of the same
benefits without the distributional consequences for other less-skilled workers who may
be competing with inmate laborers. Any serious recommendation would require much
further research on these issues.
Another question we’ve been asked to address is:
What steps are essential to improve the economic contribution
of the incarcerated labor force?
As we noted above, we see no theoretical rationale for the government to be the employer
of inmate labor. We suspect the contribution of inmate labor to economic output would
be greater if they were employed by the private sector. Shifting to an open system of
private sector employers could also have the benefit of placing all prospective employers
on a level playing field, without preferences for particular employers or for the purchase
of prison-made goods. In concert with privatization, we suggest that inmate workers be
covered by all relevant labor legislation that applies to private sector firms: including the
right to form a union, fair labor standards, and workplace safety regulations.
Because inmate laborers do not have the option to “vote with their feet” or shop
around for alternative, better paying jobs, the potential for inmate labor to be exploited is
great. In this situation, unionization may also provide important benefits and protections.
In order to maximize their economic contribution, inmate labor needs a negotiating agent
aligned with its interests, and a union could serve as that agent. A union could take
responsibility for handling outreach to employers and specialize in handling additional
security arrangements for inmate labor that would be unfamiliar and costly for each
private sector employer to undertake. If the government were to subsidize inmate labor
because of social benefits, one way to administer the subsidy would be make payments to
the union that could be used to pay for security and make inmate labor more attractive to
potential employers. A union could also provide continuity in managing relations with
the employer even when there is high turnover in the workforce. We note that since
inmate labor is not a critical component of any one private sector industry (in the way
that, say, airline mechanics are to the airline industry) they would probably not reach
agreements that lead to supra-competitive wages since employers could substitute with
other unskilled labor relatively easily. On the other hand, unionization may lead to a
more accurate valuation of the general work tasks performed in prisons, although it is not
clear that this would actually raise prison costs since increases in payments could
probably be taxed away through charges for room and board. A union may also be more
effective in convincing inmates to participate in educational programs that would raise
their wages, since inmates may (accurately) perceive that this advice is coming from a
party that has their self-interest in mind.
Another important step in improving the economic contribution of inmate labor

would be to set the “tax rate” for wage deductions at an appropriate level. Further
research will be necessary to better understand their labor supply elasticity (the sensitivity
of inmate labor force participation to the after-tax pay that they receive), perhaps using
research designs as described above for studying recidivism, but instead varying the
wages instead of the availability of work. As documented above, many former inmates
do not work after release in the legitimate labor market, but their opportunity costs (e.g.
other ways to make money, value of leisure time) may be substantially different while
incarcerated. If the tax rate is set too high, the maximum social benefits may not be
produced. Even the total revenue for available transfers will not be maximized if inmate
laborers choose not to work at a high tax rate and would have worked more a somewhat
lower tax rate.
One final point is that, since the economic contribution of inmate labor is likely to
be a very small addition to GDP, and since the main economic effect of inmate labor
would follow from a possible reduction in recidivism rates, the government should
consider whether there are more efficient and effective means than inmate labor to reduce
future recidivism rates. For this reason, we wish to reiterate that other strategies for
reducing recidivism rates and integrating inmates into mainstream society after release
should also be considered and studied. Some of these strategies may complement inmate
labor – such as requiring employers to provide specific on-the-job-skills training – and
others may be a substitute for inmate labor because they take time that diverts inmates
away from work – such as requiring general classroom courses in basic reading or the
control of aggression. Identifying ways to integrate inmates into mainstream,
law-abiding society upon release should be a priority from an economic as well as social
perspective.
Panel Remarks
In addition to their presentation, Alan Krueger and Jeffrey Kling also provided comment
to panelists, extending the detail of their views on inmate labor force participation. A
fuller sense of their views includes understanding both their remarks and their responses
to panelist questions. Their full responses, minimally edited, to the following panelists
on the following issues can be found below in the chapter presenting the panel:
● Responses to Panelists by Alan Krueger:
Panelist

Response Subjects

Gus Faucher

Minimum Wages and Wage Setting
Human Capital and Education
Exploitation and Labor Abuse

Steve Schwalb

Repatriating Offshore Jobs (Import Substitution)

Brenda Smith

Female Inmate Labor Force Participation

Greg Woodhead

Unions

● Responses to Panelists by Jeffrey Kling:
Brenda Smith

Female Inmate Labor Force Participation
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Let me begin with a caveat. Although I have written widely on economic issues
related to crime and criminal justice, prior to the invitation to participate in this project I
was only casually acquainted with the complex issues surrounding inmate labor. I have
spent a great deal of time thinking about these questions in recent months and offer my
opinions below. My opinions are based upon my training and experiences as an
economist, as well as a careful reading of materials I have obtained. I do not, however,
have first-hand experience “in the trenches” with respect to prison labor. Consequently, I
have attempted to limit my discussion to broad issues, staying away from the nuts and
bolts of implementation which I am unqualified to address.
With that important limitation in mind, my comments on prison labor are
structured as follows. I begin by laying out what I believe to be the important stylized

facts concerning inmate labor. These facts will serve as the basis for my judgments about
a number of questions. First, how big an effect on Gross Domestic Product do bans on
prison labor have? Second, how might prison labor policies be designed to create the
greatest economic benefits? Third, who would be the winners and losers if existing
limitations were removed? Fourth, what other issues besides narrow economic
considerations need to be taken into account when determining optimal policies with
respect to prison labor.
II. Stylized Facts
There are a number of key stylized facts related to inmate labor that will dictate
many of the conclusions I later present. I begin by outlining these “facts.”
Fact 1: By any macroeconomic measure, prison labor is currently and will almost
certainly remain a small (though not necessarily trivial) fraction of the economy even if
restrictions on prison industries are abolished.
Given the current set of restrictions on how prison labor can be utilized, at the
present time most prisoners do not work in jobs producing output that will be sold.
Miller, Shilton, and Petersik (1998) report that in 1997, 76,519 inmates worked in
correctional industry jobs, generating gross sales of $1.6 billion dollars. These 76,519
inmates represent less than 6/100ths of one percent of the United States labor force.
Moreover, because prisoners tend to have lower output per worker, the impact of prison
labor as a fraction of GDP is less than half as large as its share of the labor force. In the
U.S. economy, about one billion dollars of output are produced each hour. Thus the total
annual output of prison industries represents less than two hours worth of U.S. GDP.
A separate question is how important prison labor might be in the future if
restrictions on its use were removed. Once again, the answer is that prison labor will be a
small part of the overall economy. Even if every prisoner in the United States were
employed full-time (assuming here constant output per worker-hour), prison-produced
goods and services would account for only 0.4 percent of GDP.
Fact 2: Prison labor, on average, is relatively unproductive due both to the composition
of the prisoner pool and the structural impediments that prisons pose as workplaces.
While many prisoners are no doubt highly motivated and productive workers,
prisoners are not an ideal work force. Prisoners tend to have less education than the U.S.
workforce as a whole.1 They also tend to have uneven past work histories and
labor-force attachment. As a consequence, the pool of prison labor is a relatively
unskilled one, making it an unattractive workforce for employers, at least at prevailing
wages,
Jeffrey Kling and Alan Krueger provide an excellent discussion of this issue in their
paper prepared for this symposium.
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Also, there are important structural impediments to producing goods in prisons.
First, turnover rates among prison workers are high due to release from prison: roughly
forty percent of the prison population is released each year. In private sector
manufacturing, a turnover rate of production workers above twenty percent annually
would be deemed unacceptable. Such turnover is costly to employers and also
discourages training since the employer will have less time to recoup any investment
made. There are also disruptions to production as a result of periodic lockdowns.
Given these facts, it is not surprising that prison labor, on average, is not very
productive. By my rough calculations, output per prisoner-hour worked is about one
third as great as for the typical American worker.2 Because of this low productivity level,
prison industries tend not to be profitable. Evidence of this lack of profitability comes
from the fact that the Prison Enhancement Industries (PIE) program, which requires
prison industry to compete on relatively equal footing to private industry, has not thrived.
As of June 30, 1997, less than 3,000 prisoners were employed in all PIE programs across
the United States.
Fact 3: The current system of prison industry is characterized by a non-level playing
field.
When an economist speaks of a “level playing field,” it means that all competitors
have access to the same set of rules, resources, and markets for their products. A level
playing field also requires keeping the government out of decisions that can be made by
the market, such as determining who will produce a particular good or be given access to
a particular set of workers. As a general economic proposition, a level playing field is an
important ingredient of economic efficiency.
It is clear that the current situation with respect to prison labor is not characterized
by a level playing field. Prisoners are not covered by the same set of labor laws as the
rest of the work force. Prisoners are exempt from the Fair Standards Labor Act (FLSA)
that dictates a minimum hourly wage and imposes other constraints on employer
behavior. Prison-made products are often given preferential treatment with respect to
government purchases. At the same time, in many states prison industries are restricted
as to the markets they are allowed to serve. Finally, it is unclear how or why certain
private companies are granted access to prison laborers and others are not. Because there
is no free market for prisoner labor, allocation of such labor is likely to be governed
primarily by political rather than economic considerations.3
Prisoners may also be disproportionately employed in jobs that are not capital
intensive. This would also contribute to the lower marginal product of prison laborers.
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Although PIE programs come closer to achieving a level playing field, the rules
governing PIE industries nonetheless retain some undesirable aspects. For instance,
given that prison labor is generally less productive than the workforce available to private
companies, the requirement concerning paying prevailing wages in PIE programs tilts the
3

Fact 4: Reasonable estimates suggest that the social costs of crimes committed by
criminals when not incarcerated are far greater than the typical prisoner’s contribution
to GDP.
A series of academic studies have attempted to calculate the frequency with which
the incarcerated population commits crime when not behind bars (DiIulio and Piehl 1991,
Levitt 1996, Piehl and DiIulio 1995, Spelman 1994), as well as the costs that such crimes
impose on victims (Cohen 1988, Miller, Cohen, and Rossman 1993). My reading of this
literature is that the “marginal” criminal (i.e. the inmate who would be let out if the
prison population were reduced by one using whatever arbitrary procedure is currently in
place for determining who goes to prison and for how long) commits 1-2 violent crimes
and roughly 10 property crimes annually. The cost of these crimes to victims (in lost
property, injuries, psychic costs, lost years of life, and missed work) is roughly $35,000
per criminal per year. If one focuses on the “average” inmate rather than the “marginal”
inmate, the costs of crime to victims are much higher: perhaps $80,000 per criminal per
year.4 For purposes of comparison, the average annual output per prison worker in 1997
was approximately $20,000 – smaller than the damage done in crime when free. While
these numbers do not speak directly to the question of whether or not prisoners should be
allowed to work while incarcerated, these facts will be relevant in the final section of the
paper where I highlight the importance of thinking not just about the narrow economic
issues, but also on the relationship between prison labor and recidivism. Because the
social costs of crime are so high, a policy that reduces recidivism can have a social
benefit that far outweighs a prisoner’s narrow contribution to GDP.
III. How big an effect on Gross Domestic Product do bans on prison labor have?
I approach answering this question by (1) establishing a likely upper bound on the
amount of GDP that might be generated by prisoners under ideal circumstances, (2)
considering a range of issues that make it likely the upper bound estimates are too large,
and (3) thinking about the winners and losers.
An upper bound
A simple back-of-the envelope calculation as to the potential contribution of
playing field against prison industry. If prisoners are less skilled, than output per worker
will be lower and prevailing wages are not appropriate (perhaps prevailing wages per unit
of output, rather than unit of time worked would be more fitting). On the other hand, PIE
industries do not appear to pay their full share of the overhead costs of prison
management, which tilts the playing field in their favor.
The difference between the marginal and the average prisoner suggests that judges,
juries, and parole boards are able to determine which prisoners are most dangerous and
tend to lock these individuals up for greater periods of time.
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prison labor to GDP takes output per inmate-hour as fixed and makes some assumption
on how many inmates might reasonably be employed in industry jobs. Given the high
turnover rates in jails, it is likely that jail-based production will be economically
inefficient. The prison inmate population as of December 1997 was approximately 1.2
million. Although it is unrealistic to think every prisoner could be employed full time, I
will begin with that premise. Given current output per prisoner-hour (based on numbers
presented in Miller, Shilton, and Petersik (1998)) of $14.56, if every prisoner worked
full-time, then annual prison industry output would be $35 billion annually. In my
opinion, this represents an extreme upper bound that is unlikely ever to be realized.
To put this number into perspective, even in the extreme case where we went
from a situation where no prisoners worked to one in which all prisoners worked, GDP
would increase by about 0.4 percent. In comparison, between 1991 and 1997, the U.S.
economy grew 18.3 percent in real terms. So the potential economic impact we are
talking about is small relative to the macroeconomic changes that have taken place in
recent years. On the other hand, the potential output that could be generated by prisoners
is by no means trivial. Divided equally across all Americans, this translates into an
additional $125 per person annually. This is a substantial amount of production, and if it
were straightforward to achieve this increment to GDP it would absolutely be a goal
worth pursuing.
A more realistic conjecture
There are many reasons, however, to think that the estimates above dramatically
overstate the probable increase in GDP associated with lifting prison labor restrictions.
First, it is unlikely that all prisoners would be employed in industry jobs. Fifty percent
participation might be a more reasonable assumption. Second, it may be that as the
prison labor force is expanded, the marginal worker has fewer skills and a lower
commitment to working, translating into a lower level of output per worker. Third, not
all of the prison industry output would necessarily represent a true increase in GDP.
Some of the output is likely to be replacing other production that would have otherwise
taken place outside of the prison (perhaps at a higher cost). In other words, just as some
U.S. jobs are lost when production moves to foreign countries, a parallel story could hold
for prisons. Fourth, only a portion of the total value of goods and services produced in
prison truly reflects “value added” on the part of the prisoners. If a prison industry buys a
widget for $10, adds bells and whistles to the widget, and resells the widget for $15, then
the actual increment to GDP associated with the prison industry is only $5 per widget.
Taken together, I think that these factors suggest that a reasonable estimate of the
true increment to GDP that would result from putting prisoners to work without
restrictions might be $5-10 billion dollars a year, or less than one-third of the
upper-bound estimate presented above. Nonetheless, an additional $5-10 billion dollars
annually is a substantial amount of production and if there is a way to achieve this
production it should be pursued.

IV. How might prison labor policies be designed to create the greatest economic
benefits?
As noted in the introduction, I do not intend to offer specific opinions about the
day-to-day operation of prison industry. Rather, I focus here on a few “big picture”
issues anchored in one fundamental economic principle: economic efficiency requires a
level playing field.
Economic efficiency begins with production being done by the lowest-cost
producer. By costs, I don’t mean accounting costs, but rather true resource costs. For
instance, if the government allows one producer access to prison labor that is subsidized
by virtue of the government paying the costs of the physical plant and requiring prisoners
to work for extremely low wages, then that producer may be able to sell output more
cheaply than a competitor. But it may be economically inefficient because the producer
is being subsidized by taxpayer dollars spent on maintaining the prison. It also may be
inefficient because a second producer, given access to cheap prison labor, could have
produced at even lower cost. Finally, it may be inefficient because different producers
spend money attempting to lobby the government for the right to gain access to the cheap
prison labor.
The current system of prison labor regulation has all of these potential
inefficiencies built into it. As well, by giving preferences to prison-made goods in some
cases (e.g. government purchases), and restricting the sale of prison-made goods in other
instances, the present set of rules further distorts economic choices in ways that are likely
to adversely affect economic efficiency. My advice, therefore, would be to dismantle the
current set of regulations, put all competitors on a level-playing field, and let the market
dictate the outcome.
Putting all competitors on a level-playing field would entail the following four
changes.5 It is important to note that I view each of the four elements as critical to a
successful transition to a more rational utilization of prison labor. If any one of the
elements were to be omitted, the program would be unlikely to be completely successful.
First, I would privatize prison industry. As long as the government is in charge of
prison industries, it will be difficult if not impossible to avoid decisions being made with
political rather than economic justifications. Furthermore, the difficulty in allocating
costs between prison overhead and the prison industry will be impossible to solve.
Second, every prison system that wants to have inmates employed in prison
industries should put the rights to use those workers out to a competitive bid of
To reiterate my definition of level paying field is a situation where everyone plays by
the same rules and the government stays out of decisions that are better made by the
market.
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prospective employers. The prison would stipulate certain conditions (e.g. the length of
contract, types of training required, wages to be paid, etc.), and subject to agreeing to
those terms, the highest bidder would obtain the rights to access the prison labor.6
Individual prisoners would have the right to choose whether or not they wanted to
participate in the prison labor force, just as individuals who are not incarcerated have this
choice. It would be incumbent on the private company to provide wages and working
conditions that are attractive enough that prisoners would choose to accept the jobs.
Voluntary participation on the part of prisoners is especially important given the potential
exploitation of prison labor that has sometimes occurred in the past.
In my opinion, this competitive bidding system is critical to any proposal to
liberalize the regulation of prison labor. This system has a number of attractive features:
no company can complain that another company has an unfair advantage because of
access to prison labor since the complaining company had their chance to bid, it brings
revenue directly to the state via bids, and if it is economically inefficient to use prison
labor then there will be no bidders and production will not occur. Under this system it
would be fine for the government to pay the costs of guards and the physical structure. If
they do so, private companies will bid higher for the right to use the prison labor, so in
the end the market will take care of it.
The third change that would be useful in leveling the playing field would be to
extend current civilian labor laws to cover prisoners. In particular, I think minimum
wages dictated by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) should apply, as should
employer requirements concerning workers comp, contributions to Social Security, etc.
While not critical to my proposal, perhaps prisoners would also be allowed to unionize
(how this might be best accomplished is one of the factors I feel unqualified to address).
It is quite reasonable for the government to garnish prisoner wages to pay for maintaining
prisons, providing support to dependents of those incarcerated (there are more children of
inmates than inmates), or victim compensation.7 The key point is not to pay the inmates
a particular wage, but rather to put the choice between prison labor and civilian labor on
an equal footing. If the prison labor is more profitable given the same set of rules, then
the prison labor should be used rather than civilian labor and vice versa.
The fourth and final change that I propose would be to eliminate all preferences
and restrictions with respect to prison-made goods. No one should be required to buy
prison-made goods and no one should be prohibited from doing so if they want to. Since
prison industries would be producing on the same terms as all others, they should be able
It may even be the case that the government would be willing to accept negative bids if
prison industries have other social benefits, such as reduced recidivism or making it
easier to control prisons.
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Dividing up the prisoner’s wage is a very tricky and important issue. In my opinion, it
is fundamentally a political decision rather than an economic one. The various
stakeholders would undoubtedly want to be involved in such a decision.
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to sell their goods on the same terms.
Winners and Losers
Economic winners and losers from a liberalization of prison labor depend
critically on the way in which the program is implemented. Given that I outlined what I
think is a reasonable set of rules for liberalizing inmate labor in the preceding section, I
will focus my efforts here on describing what I think would be the likely distributional
consequences of the program outlined above, rather than attempt to conjecture about the
full range of possible liberalization schemes.8
I think the single most likely outcome of the liberalization I propose is that very
little prison labor will actually be utilized if competitive bids are required to be positive.
In other words, I believe that most prison industries, if they had to pay the minimum
wage, would not be profitable. So for the sake of argument, let me take a case where bids
to use prison labor can be negative (i.e. the government pays a company to produce using
prisoners) and the bulk of prisoners are employed.
Relative to the current situation, the only clear losers that I see in my scheme are
the executives at UNICOR and state-run prison industries (which would cease to exist in
my framework, or at least would have to compete with private companies for prison
labor), and the handful of private companies that currently use prison labor at government
subsidized rates. With competitive bidding, these companies will be forced to pay the
full value of the access to prison labor.
The clear winners in this program are the businesses that previously competed
against prison industries, the government, prisoners and their families, consumers, and
taxpayers. Businesses no longer have to face subsidized competitors and now have equal
access to prison labor. The government is better off since private companies are likely to
produce more efficiently than government run industries, and therefore these private
prison industries will be willing to pay more (or perhaps accept lower subsidies) than
would be required for the government to directly run the business. Also, by putting the
inmate labor out to competitive bids, the government will capture much of the surplus
that existing privately-run prison industries have likely been collecting. Since the
government will still be able to garnish wages from the prisoners, having more prisoners
working generates more government revenue. Prisoners are better off because more of
them will be working and given that the prison industries are run by private companies,
the way in which the businesses run are likely to be more similar to civilian jobs than is
currently the case. Although prisoner wages will be heavily garnished as is currently the
For example, if we keep our present system of preferences and subsidies, but remove all
restrictions on the markets to which prison industries can sell, the companies that
compete with the prison industries, as well as their workers, are likely to be hurt. How
badly depends critically on how concentrated the output of prison industries would be if
such a liberalization occurred.
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practice, in my scheme prison labor would qualify for social security benefits.
Furthermore, working conditions might improve if existing labor laws are applied to
prisoners. Finally, consumers should benefit from the fact that the playing field has been
leveled, resulting in production being done as efficiently as possible. This should
manifest itself in lower prices for goods and lower taxes to pay for prisons.
The final stakeholder that I have not yet talked about is civilian workers/labor
unions. The impact on such workers is unclear. By enforcing FLSA and other labor
laws, my scheme eliminates many of the existing subsidies to prison labor. From that
perspective, it reduces low-wage competition and benefits labor. It would also allow
prison workers to unionize, which would be beneficial to organized labor. On the other
hand, by eliminating restrictions on the sale of prison-made goods, my plan is likely to
generate some competition as well. Indeed, if the number of prison workers go up as I
envision would be the case, the overall level of competition with private labor will have
increased. The effect is likely to be relatively minor, however. The rise in the labor force
associated with putting prisoners to work is about one percent. The labor market
frequently absorbs shocks of this magnitude with ease. Low-skilled civilian workers are
likely to be hurt more since prisoners are largely unskilled and will compete directly with
these workers. The impact on low-skilled workers requires further study to make an
accurate assessment. In general, labor economics suggests that any adverse impact on
civilian employment is likely to occur primarily in the short run (five years or less). Over
time, labor markets will move back into equilibrium with little impact on civilian
employment, but potentially some small permanent decline in wages of low-skilled
civilians.
V. Beyond narrow economic considerations: does prison labor reduce recidivism?
To this point, I have focused exclusively on the narrow question of economic
efficiency, as the organizers of this conference have requested. In my opinion, however,
the question of whether putting prisoners to work reduces recidivism is also of critical
importance.
As noted in the stylized facts presented in the beginning of this paper, existing
estimates of the social costs of crime committed by prisoners when free are on the order
of $30,000 a year. If working a prison job has even a relatively small impact on
recidivism, the social benefits could be enormous. For instance, if working a prison job
resulted in 10 percent of prisoners dropping out of crime upon their release, then the
annual social benefit from reduced crime would be $6.1 billion.9
My reading of the (very limited) existing literature on recidivism and prison labor,
however, leads me to believe that working in prison industry is unlikely to yield a large
One rationale for allowing negative bids in the auction for prison labor described earlier
in the paper is that putting prisoners to work might have a beneficial impact on future
recidivism.
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recidivism benefit. Although there are a handful of studies of federal, Florida, and Ohio
prisoners that find lower recidivism rates among prison workers relative to non-workers,
the critical concern in interpreting these studies is whether the prisoners who worked are
in fact comparable to those who did not work. In particular, one worries that the workers
were more motivated than the non-workers and that motivation is itself an important
determinant of recidivism likelihood. Consequently, the impact of having a prison job on
later recidivism may not be causal. Evidence presented by Maguire et al. (1988) tends to
support this less sanguine interpretation of the data. Looking at almost 2,000 New York
inmates, they find that those who worked in prison were less likely to recidivate than
non-workers, but once a range of prisoner characteristics such as prior felony arrests,
military service, time served, and marital status are controlled for, having worked in
prison no longer predicts lower recidivism rates.
It is surprising that so little research has been devoted to this important question.
The ideal way to attempt to answer this question in the future is through randomized
experiments in which prisoners are divided into two pools: one that is eligible to
participate in prison industry and another which is not.10 By comparing future recidivism
across these two groups, an estimate of the independent contribution of prison labor in
determining future criminal involvement could be obtained.
Panel Remarks
In addition to his presentation, Steven Levitt also provided comment to panelists,
extending the detail of his views on inmate labor force participation. A fuller sense of his
views includes understanding both his remarks and his responses to panelist questions.
His full responses, minimally edited, to the following panelists on the following issues
can be found below in the chapter presenting the panel:
Panelist

Response Subjects

Wendell Primus

Voluntary Labor
Structuring Incentives

Brenda Smith

Female Inmate Labor Force Participation
Distribution of Inmate Earnings

There may be some ethical concerns associated with prohibiting some prisoners from
working, but to the extent that there are fewer jobs than prisoners, this may be less of a
concern since not all prisoners would have worked anyway.
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Chapter 6
The Panel
Introduction
Following their presentations, the five economists were
queried by a panel of key stakeholder interests. The panel
was designed to identify key applications, extensions,
problems, inconsistencies, and unresolved issues affecting
inmate labor force participation. Listed alphabetically
(and also in their order of appearance), the panelists and
their interests were –
● Gus Faucher, U.S. Department of Treasury (Taxpayers)
● Linda Haithcox, National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP, Minorities)
● Harry Holzer, U.S. Department of Labor (Labor)
● Wendell Primus, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
(Children and Families)
● Steve Schwalb, Federal Prison Industries (FPI)
● Brenda Smith, American University (Women)
● Charles Sullivan, Citizens United for Rehabilitation
of Errants (Inmates and Inmate Families)
● Gregory Woodhead, American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
A scheduled panelist from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was
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and forecasts for the U.S. labor force. Amy Kaslow,
moderator of the symposium, interjects a few questions, and
Thomas Petersik, organizer of the symposium, adds two
questions at the end.
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The Panel
MR. FAUCHER: I am Gus Faucher, an economist at the
Treasury Department, specializing in labor market issues.
Tom Petersik asked me to give the taxpayer perspective.
There were three points that struck me in this morning's
discussions from the papers. The first is at least we
think that it is a good idea for inmates to work,
particularly that it might reduce recidivism. And Jeff
Kling raised the point that it might be interesting to
conduct a random experiment and to find out if indeed it
does work. As an economist, I would find that an
interesting topic. So we think that it is a good idea for
inmates to work, both for themselves, but also for society
in general.
We are also concerned, however, about unfair
competition. We are concerned about subsidies that go to
employers of prison labor. And we are concerned about the
effect that inmate labor might have on, particularly,
low-skilled workers in the economy.

Third, and Richard Freeman and Alan Krueger
brought this point up, that we think that inmates are going
to have low productivity, which makes a lot of sense.
Obviously, if they are committing crimes they probably
don't have good labor market opportunities.

They tend to be poorly educated.
what they will be producing.

So we are concerned about

If we are concerned about unfair competition, we
want inmates to earn minimum wage. However we also think
that employers probably won't be willing to hire them at
the minimum wage. And my question is, what is the
interaction there and how do we prevent the unfair
competition and yet ensure that these inmates are going to
be hired and what is the interaction with minimum wage in
prison labor? I think Alan Krueger has done a lot of work
on the minimum wage, and I would be particularly interested
in hearing his thought on this.
MR. KRUEGER: Thanks. I think that Gus raises a number of
important points. On the minimum wage, what I would
recommend is that, I think he is right that a number of
inmates would have trouble earning minimum wage in prison,
in part because of their low human capital and in part
because of the circumstances in prison would prevent some
types of businesses from operating. You can't run a
McDonald's, I presume, in prison.
I don't think that prison labor is for everyone.

And I think that, especially if we take a longer horizon,
one would want to try to raise the skills of those people
who are in prison. So I would think about ways of trying
to raise the human capital of those who are in prison who
would earn so little that they couldn't get a job in the
labor force anyway after they are out of prison. So I
think that is one partial answer for that question.
There are some circumstances, I suppose, where
one would entertain permitting a sub-minimum wage. This
is, I think, in part why Richard recommended trying to
compete with non-American labor, which in many cases is
paid less than the American minimum wage. And that is
something that I would consider.
But I think as a general policy, one has to worry about
inmate labor being exploited since they can't pick and
choose their employers, which would make me think very
seriously about extending as many of the labor standards as
MR. HOLZER: Thank you. As a representative of the
Department of Labor, I was very pleased that all four
speakers spoke sympathetically about applying fair labor
standards to prison workers. And I believe all four
speakers, at least as a broad concept, expressed some
interest in the possibility of trying to unionize prison
laborers, though I have a little hard time seeing how that
might work in reality. But at least as a general principal
it was an interesting thought.
I would try to push that consensus toward next steps in
terms of specific policy actions. What I think I heard is
maybe that all four speakers would favor, on the one hand,
relaxing the protections that UNICOR now enjoys, not only
to its monopoly status in federal procurement, but also in
terms of its ability to pay prison workers, well below
minimum wage standards.
At the same time, maybe the speakers would favor some
relaxation of the restrictions on private employers in the
Prison Industries Enhancement Act, so whether it leaves
room there for some trade off, again, of putting more
pressure on UNICOR at the same time of some lifting of
restrictions in the private sector, all within the context
of maintaining labor standards, and is there a sort of
practical way of doing that?
The other brief question, what I heard all the speakers
saying, that by far the big effect would be on recidivism

of ex-offenders. And what I heard was a subtext of
potential for positive externalities [benefits] for the
rest of society, which runs a little bit counter to the
kind of level-the-playing-field argument that Alan
[Krueger], Jeff [Kling], and Steve [Levitt] were making.
If you believe that there is a real possible externality,
is there, in fact, some reason for government subsidies
here to help, or what is the most appropriate form of
government subsidy or government investment in these
workers to offset any of those disadvantages that they are
going to experience in the labor market?
MR. FREEMAN: I thought that Steve [Levitt] put this
correctly. He said that some contracts with all the
externalities were great, the contracts could very well be
the real way to pay you to run a prison industry operation.
And I think the same is true of minimum wage, since you are
deducting, you will be taking away some money from the
people for their room and board, there are a lot of places
to cut deals to make subsidies or otherwise make them more
competitive. Because I am sure that one could, let's say

the prison labor really was below minimum wage, but we
thought there were these big externalities.
We have just two studies that one finds credible on
recidivism. One is a pretty big effect, the one Jeff
[Kling] mentioned. And then there is a state study that
doesn't show these effects. So I think it is absolutely
critical, on the government side, to first decide do we
really get a big recidivism effect. And the federal prison
industry study said just a big effect from trading. It was
about the same magnitude as was the effect from the work.
So that gets to this human capital thing that Alan
[Krueger] mentioned. That looked as effective as did the
actual prison inmate thing itself.
So then you want to say well, which one of those two is
cheaper to run and which would you have to subsidize less.
But given that, I can imagine there are many ways to write
contracts here that would enable us to accomplish what we
want socially and to provide subsidies to hopefully to the
right people to do what we want done.
MR. MARSHALL: It seems to me that there are several
problems involved in the assumption that people couldn't
earn the minimum wage. One is to compare the whole prison
population. You have got a selective workforce in prison
industries. So that is not the same population at all. So
you have to look at that.

Then the second problem with many of the studies is that
they are based on the system as it exists, not the way it
could be. So that is the reason I prefer the design
project. Let's try some things to see if it can, in fact,
work because there is nobody arguing that the present
system is as good as it could be, even if you don't believe
that it is a horrible system. It certainly could be
improved a good bit.
And the concept of balancing competitive forces is fairly
well established in trade policy. I mentioned the adverse
effect wage rate, and I think we could learn some things
from that.
As to what you subsidize, we should have learned a lot from
economic development. You subsidize human capital
development, not industry. You don't need to subsidize the
industry. The subsidy you give the industry doesn't have
to pay the full cost of developing the people, but you
could negotiate the balancing part of that process.
It is not hard to see how the unionization would work
either. One advantage of studying history and of having
been around and take part in a good bit of it is that I
remember when they told us that government employees could
never unionize. And therefore, it would never happen,
Franklin Roosevelt said, and should not. You shouldn't

allow, and even though he is reported to have said, “If I
were a working American today, the first thing I would do
is join a union,” he was ready to make an exception for
government employees. Today, government employees are
unionized. They don't all strike. They don't all have the
right to strike.
I would also point out that a careful study of that would
be to say what kind of strikes are going on now in the
prisons. Even if you don't have a formal strike, you get
informal strikes, what industrial nations people call a
strike in detail. That is, protest against the system as
exists now because you have no other way to have an outlet
for your grievances.
I think that it would be useful. That is where I
think some comparative work would pay off. It could very
well be that you greatly improve the process by giving
inmates voice in the formulation of the rules in the
industries where they work. I am not talking about
organizing, unionizing all prisoners. That is a different
matter. But if they are going to be competing with
unionized employers in the private sector, it is hard for
me to see what the justification is for them not to be able
to form unions.
Now, I also learned as a mediator if a word is causing you
trouble, drop it. So if union causes trouble,

let's say an inmates council. And then see how you would
need to structure that so that it would really be
effective. The worst inmates council could very well be a
company union. That is to say, something the warden
created and picked the people on it to tell him what he
wanted to hear. Well, that is not very useful to the
warden. It is not useful to improving the performance of
the system. The logic to the collective bargaining is that
the people who have the problem formulate the rules to deal
with it. And that if the parties bring to the table their
relative interest and perspectives, you get much better
rules than you would get any other ways. And I think that
a logical case can be made.
I think it needs to made voluntary just like it is in the
private sector. If inmates saw the needs for an inmates
council, they could then participate in it. I think what
you have to guard against with a population that is easily
exploited is that what appears to be voluntary might be
very involuntary. It is like it was when I was in the
Navy. They say everybody wants to take out life insurance
step forward. Company forward, march! It wasn't voluntary
at all. So there are all kinds of ways, and I think that
requires that the inmates really have an independent source
of power, independent from the system, to make it possible
for it to work most effectively.
And as I say, I don't know it can be done, because the
other lesson I have learned is that the obvious is often
wrong and that you never can tell by deductive logic what
will really work. That is the reason I have a preference
for the experiments, for actually doing it to see if you
can make it work someplace.
MS. HAITHCOX: Good morning. My name is Linda Witherspoon
Haithcox. I direct the economic development programs of
the NAACP. And before I make my brief comments on the
issues that have been discussed here, I would like to at
least make a point of saying that I think in these kinds of
forums the presenters and the panelists should be
reflective of the issue that is at hand. And although the
presenters are very educated and very astute economists, I
am very curious to know if any of the panel has, in fact,
interviewed or been in a prison system, talked with an
inmate, and that that is really who needs to be here to
discuss the issue. I did not hire them, but I am concerned
because certainly representing people of color,
representing women, and discussing an issue that impacts
our communities more so than others, we need to make sure

that all voices are being heard. So on that note, I will
move on and discuss or comment on the presenters' issues.
I would like to commend Mr. Marshall and Mr. Freeman for
their models. I agree that there does need to be some
standardization. Unionization is a little too far out for
me. A little too far out. Everybody can't be part of a
union. But I do appreciate that all of the presenters
obviously had similar findings, which leads you to believe
that there needs to be other research and other studies.
And also, the panel should be reflective of Corporate
America.
In fact, as you were talking, Mr. Marshall, I thought about
the privatization of the prison system, and what impact
that would have on profit margins and on the labor force.
Let's just take an example that if a company decided to
make an investment into a prison system and then were able
to utilize that workforce and call them employees, and they
could do that, what impact would that have?
One of the other issues and
That is always the issue in
are in the process or being
their community, the skill,

concerns I have is re-entry.
our community. Once inmates
prepared for re-entry into
and their skill level or no

level at all in some cases. And we joke a lot and look at
the programs like the HBO "Oz". And I was talking with one
of the other people in the audience about another HBO
series that came on recently about Lorton prison. And that
is the real sign of what is going on. We can sit here and
talk about all of the tax issues, all the economy and how
it impacts the world. The reality is these are people who
have to come back into their communities. There is not a
manufacturing company in Southeast D.C., on the west side
of Chicago, and they have to be prepared to deal with the
reality of their life. And that is not a discussion that
we like to have, but it is something that is very real. It
is something that the NAACP as an organization deals with
everyday.
Just a quick question. How many of you in here have had
direct family members or someone close to you who have been
through a federal or a state prison system. Just raise
your hand. Okay. I have to raise my hand too. And it
does make a difference, it really does, as to how you
address the reality of what is going on in society.
Privatization, and I am not trying to change the subject at
all, but privatization of prisons is very critical, and
labor force.
MR. MARSHALL: I think you raise very good points, and
therefore I would like to respond to it. I did talk with
prisoners and inmates and read their materials. I had
letters from them. My daughter, who wrote her dissertation
on this, interviewed a large number of them and she
actually worked in the Massachusetts prison system while
she was there.
In the kind of work I do, you would never think about
designing an intervention or a program without bringing the
people to the table who are affected by it. That is the
reason I believe in this kind of representative democracy,
the most effective things are the people who have programs,
have the problems that bring them to the table.
And I think there are some good writings by inmates. One
that I read in connection with my paper is called, The
Celling of America, written entirely by inmates. And they
bring a perspective that nobody else has. I think if you
are going to try to design a program, you don't design it
entirely from their perspective, because their perspective
is narrow and out of focus. They have inadequate
information.
Another advantage of the kind of negotiation process is

that everybody comes away with better information than when
they went into it. In fact, as a mediator, I have two
rules that I always use to start with. The first rule,
nobody recommends anything until we agree on the facts.
And frequently, if you can get agreement on the facts, you
narrow the range of the conflict.
The other good rule of mediation is no blame casting. I
don't care why you got the way you are. Let's agree that
there is enough blame to go around, that we are all part of
a system that has not served us well, and what we ought to
be here to talk about is what do we do to fix it and to
move forward. And as a mediator, if you can do those
things, you can usually get the parties moving in the right
direction. But I think you are absolutely right about that
who is at the table, and to bring that perspective to
balance it with other perspectives.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, we are talking about such a small
part of the population. I think that is basically what
everybody has pointed out, that the numbers of people in
prison, when you deal with the total number of people in
the economy, is really very, very small. And I think this
issue is no different than every other issue that is based
in the economy. It is just part of the whole.
MS. HAITHCOX:
small part of
population is
population in
force. So we

Just a follow up. People of color are not a
the economy. And by far, the inmate
certainly, there is a disparity in the inmate
people of color and the economy and the labor
can't pretend like the numbers are so great

and our numbers are so insignificant that we don't need to
talk about this in real world numbers.
MR. PRIMUS: For 13 years I had the privilege of working
for Dan Rostenkowski, the chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee. And one of the comments I will never forget
that he said after being incarcerated for about a year, he
said we are letting these young black men rot in jail.
Meaning we were doing very little to help them become
rehabilitated and move into our society.
The perspective that I am bringing to this conversation
today is we think we have estimates that about 1.5 million
children have one of their parents in jail. And the thing
that I have been doing a lot of work in the past year is
thinking about how to increase the level of earnings of
non-custodial parents in general, their involvement with
the child support enforcement program, and how to help
those kinds of parents meet their parental
responsibilities.
I also am told there is research that says that a prisoner
who has a close connection to family and gets a job quickly
after leaving the prison is less likely to return. Those
are two very important factors.
Having said that, the two questions I have, of

this wage, the minimum wage, how would that be divided as a
policy matter, between the prisoner, his children on the
outside, the victims, maybe, of the crime, and room and
board? How would you determine that policy? I also
believe we are a little unrealistic, because we expect
welfare mothers to work, that work shouldn't be compulsory
here. It can't just be voluntary, at least from a
political matter.
The second question is how much of our efforts in this
contract that you want to write should be geared toward
building the skills, et cetera, of the prisoner, versus a
make-work kind of pay situation? How would you write the
contract that strikes the appropriate balance, trade off,
between those two objectives?
MR. FREEMAN: If I were writing these contracts, I would
say to the person of the group, be it a private or
governmental group, you are going to be paid in part by how
well these prisoners are reintegrated into society,
recidivism, their employment because I don't think you can
micro-manage this. And certainly economists can't. As one
of us said, we are very abstract stuff. I had trouble
putting that [projector] button on, and somebody had to
tell me to push the yellow thing or the red thing. But I
think the contract would have to be that you are putting on
to the providers of "the prison services" that they will be
paid and there will be more profits for that group,
whatever the group was - it could be state or federal or
private - on the basis of the outcomes. And the outcome
that we want is that these people, in larger numbers,
reintegrate in their communities, get jobs and don't
recidivate.
I wouldn't dare think of how we can cut up the, say, $6 an
hour. I think that's, we could do experiments, in a sense
we could try different ones. Prisoners have to be
motivated. You want to give money back to the families,
obviously, and the taxpayers have got to get their cut from
the lower charge so it is less expensive to house them.
But I would let that be determined empirically.
MR. MARSHALL: Let me make a couple comments. One, one of
the things economists do and have demonstrated, is that
reward systems matter, and that you get what you reward.
And that is ordinarily what you would measure. I used to
say to my pupils, if you don't want it, don't measure it,
because that is what we are going to reward. And it is not
hard to establish kind of general principles that you would

create opportunity structures for inmates, for the prisons,
with the reward system.
Our problem now is that we get what we reward, and what we
reward is incarceration and a continuation of the

system. We don't reward rehabilitation, reintegration into
society, or any of those things that we say.
In my school reform work I have found that you get no
brownie points for student learning. You are rewarded for
average daily attendance, not student learning. And
therefore, in fact, you get a perverse incentive. The more
the students learn, the less you get because the quicker
they get through. And therefore, a perverse reward system
is heavily built into all of our systems, including the
criminal justice system.
One of the first things I would do would be to look for the
present rewards, the implicit rewards, and see what you are
getting for that, and how that perpetuates the system and
think if we can conceive of a different set of rewards.
One reward that seems to be fairly clear is that if you
can't get a job, you go into crime. Well, that is an
incentive structure. That is a reward system. So if we
don't reward people for working, then we shouldn't be
surprised that they then get into crime.
Now, with respect to the voluntary, you raise a very
serious point here. Because if this labor is not
voluntary, it would be in violation of international law
for us to let those goods to be sold in the open market.
It violates ILO Convention 105. And, in fact, the AFL CIO
has

lodged a complaint with -- I think they have lodged it,
they said they were going to -- with ILO that the same,
that is the charge we are making against China. That is a
fairly well established principle in U.S. trade law, is
that you cannot import things in the United States made
with forced labor. That was even in the so-called
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Which is the way we kept a lot of
stuff out of South Africa until they changed their laws to
do away with forced labor. The contract that the South
African Mine Company signed with their workers was a civil
contract with a criminal penalty. And we said until you
change that law, none of the stuff produced in South
African mines would come into the United States. That
caused them to change it faster than prayer did or wishful
thinking. And they called a special session and changed
their law. So I think that we have to pay pretty close
attention to this question of whether it really is
voluntary or not. And if it is not going to be voluntary,
then we have got a serious problem with working in the open
markets.
MR. LEVITT: Just one comment with respect to the
compulsory versus voluntary. I think what I would envision
is there are educational programs. There is prison work,
it is not labor, mopping the floor, things like that. And
then there is the prison industry. And one of the ways in
which

to make it voluntary in the sense of the welfare mother
parallel, is that they are not forced to work, they just
don't get welfare anymore if they don't work.
So if there is a higher wage for working within the prison,
in the industry sector than, say, in the educational
sector, now that might be the wrong way. We might want it
just the opposite. We might want to pay higher wages to
the skill development. But it is a way to make it
voluntary and yet, perhaps, politically acceptable, just to
give a menu of choices.
MR. PRIMUS: I appreciate Ray Marshall's comment about the
voluntary-involuntary. I still have some difficulties that
if this dad, typically, has a child support order and he
refuses to follow through on that obligation and were
making the mother who is, let's say, on the outside
basically work, that seems to me a bit inequitable. And I
guess I would argue that most of you have ducked the
question, I mean, at some point we do have to really
decide. Yes, I would like to run experiments, too, to see
which would reward the prisoner more. Obviously, if we
gave most of it to him, that would be the most reward. But
he also has obligations. And the question is how do you
really balance that. So I think that you have argued, you
ducked the question.
MR. MARSHALL: Well, say we can probably do it better than
we do it now. We do it now, don't we, by fiat, you know,
by somebody decides. But you don't do any kind of bringing
all the people to the table to make the decision.
MR. PRIMUS: I guess the question is how is that being
decided. Because the prison officials maybe care about the
room and the board, and you have got other institutions
that care about the family and the child support. I mean,
are all of those, when that decision is made, are they all
at the table with an equal voice in terms of how we are
going to do this?
MR. MARSHALL: I don't think so. And that is the reason I
say I think we can do better than we do. We are doing it
now, aren't we? You do make the adoptions. I don't know
enough about it, but I do know enough about how these
things work, is that, and I would find that out before

I became serious about a policy proposal. You need to take
all of these things into consideration. The question I
would raise is not whether you do it, but can you improve
on the way you are doing it now.
MR. SCHWALB: Thank you. My name is Steve Schwalb. I am
the chief operating officer, Federal Prison Industries.
And let me, first of all, commend all of the speakers this
morning. I want to, at least on my slant and perspective,
and perhaps some of my colleagues in the prison industries
work in the audience, dispel one myth some of you may be
laboring under, and that is that somehow any or all of your
suggestions, with perhaps the suggestion of unionizing
inmates, that any of the rest of those are necessarily
threatening or problematic or that there is resistance on
our part to those ideas. We are very intrigued by those,
and I think they all make a lot of sense and have a lot of
merit.
The overriding consideration from prison
administrators and prison industry managers' perspective is
to have sufficient work opportunities to not have rampant
inmate idleness on your hands, because we all know often
the outcomes of idleness. So we are not particularly
focused, speaking especially for federal prison industries,
on what type of product, what type of wage, what type of
market --

all things are on the table as far as we are concerned, as
long as it is not just all theory and we have idleness on
our hands because none of it works.
I was particularly intrigued by Professor Freeman's
suggestion. I would like to hear the reaction of the other
economists, especially since he covered it, about the idea
of having inmates focus their work opportunities on
import-competing commodities. And that is an idea that has
intrigued us for some time. Obviously it would take a
change of authority and statute.
The question is, is there or should there be viewed as the
difference on the impact on the domestic economy of the
United States between inmates producing products with low
wages and imported products being made by people in foreign
countries at low wages and imported? And I ask that
question sort of in two parts. One is how do we segregate
out the work so that we properly identify that we are, in
fact, competing with imports?
Secondly, even if we don't, since there are domestic
companies that are competing with imports today, low wage
imports, why is it economically attractive from a broad
trade perspective to encourage that and it is so important
to have inmate labor engaged in the same thing, in many
cases, as some of you suggested, wages that are even
higher, frankly than are paid in civilian labor rates in
foreign countries?
MR. KRUEGER: Let me make an initial response to that. I
told Richard before, I liked his suggestion. The way I
interpret it is he wants to focus on industries that are,
in economic jargon, outside the “Cone of Diversification.”
And what that means is that industries in the U.S. no
longer produce it because our general level of productivity
or wages or endowments have brought us to a point where it
is more efficient for us to import in those industries.
For example, we no longer make TVS, or very few TVS in the
United States. If you choose an industry which is outside
the cone of diversification -- sounds like something on
“Get Smart” -- if you choose an industry where the U.S. is
no longer in that business, then as Richard said, the
inmate labor is not competing with domestic labor and we
don't have these negative implications that we are
concerned about. The difficulty is, as a practical
standpoint, is much trade takes place within industries,
both imports and exports. It is a major puzzle in the
field of international trade why so much intra-industry

trade takes place.
You can't just look at an industry and say we only import
there, so we will focus on that. And as you pointed

out, if you choose an industry where we have both imports
and exports, then I think it has very little difference
than choosing an industry where we are by and large
producing domestically in terms of the ramifications for
the rest of the private sector. I also think that in the
long run, there would be a lot of pressure to try to expand
this set of industries, to bring it back within the cone of
diversification, industries where we are producing. So I
think that is a perfectly sensible principle. I don't know
how far it takes us in practice.
MR. FREEMAN: I am a little less dubious on how practical
it could be because part of this industry thing is the
definition of industries in our data. And think of an
industry that is 90% imports at this point, shoes. There
are 10% American shoe people there. But if we quickly can
tell you that they still make Texas boots in Texas, and I
can name the American shoe companies still around and the
kinds of shoes that they would make in this country. And
the vast bulk of the inexpensive, not immediately
fashionable shoes are made in Romania, China, a whole set
of countries actually that do it. And that is what you
would do, in that these are the sets of products outside
this cone of diversification. We couldn't even imagine the
American industry being able to go simply because our
workers are so much more skilled and their wages are so
much higher that barring a breakdown of international
trade, will never go back to a certain set of industries.
One worries a little bit, apparel. But there, also, where
the Americans are producing things, it is in niche parts of
the markets. This cone of diversification - Alan is
absolutely right - given any definition of industries, we
will find some American producers, and so there is a
problem. But then if you look a little more deeply, and
the reason I picked the Chinese, the largely Chinese-made
now, these little plastic toys, I know any, if you do,
raise your hand. Has anybody picked up a little plastic
toy and seen it say “Made in USA”? A couple of years ago
it was made in Taiwan. But the Chinese have a complete
market on that type of thing. I can't imagine that ever
coming back to the U.S.
So I think we could, indeed, find products. The question,
obviously, is could prison-made goods in the U.S. in these
areas compete with the foreign products, and that would
have to be looked at case by case. And some business-type
people are going to have to make some judgments that we
hope would be correct. But there are a lot of products
there. We are running such a huge trade deficit at this

point, there are many, many products that are outside this
cone of diversification.

MR. KRUEGER: One other follow up point I was thinking as
Richard was describing this. One of the main reasons for
trying to encourage prison labor is to reintegrate people
into the community when they leave. And to the extent
there are some specific skills that they learn while they
are in prison, it would be very difficult if they take a
job which is only available in China outside of the
prisons. So I think that is another cost of this.
MR. MARSHALL: It seems to me that if you did
these other things, I will make two observations to your
comments. One is I don't conceive anything that I have
recommended as necessarily threatening to prison industry
system. I can see where the prison industry system
threatens the prisons and the culture of the institution
itself. And since I applaud that, I think that it would do
the prisons a lot of good to have them subjected to a
different set of rewards and a different set of
institutional response. But if you do the things to
balance the competition, you shouldn't really be concerned
that much about what the effects are going to be because
you minimize the adverse effects that you could likely have
on the society.
But part of the thing that would have to be done then is to
take the industries that would have the least effect. And
that way, I think, and it is a strategic activity where you
are talking about change. The best rule I have ever found
is organize your friends and disperse your enemies. And in
picking industries, it would be useful to do that. Don't
concentrate them in places where you know you are going to
organize a lot of opposition to it.
MS. SMITH: Good morning. First, I thought that I was
going to have to use Steve Levitt's anecdote because I was
so far down the line and I was trying to think of a
substitute for Sophia Lauren. One of the things is that
this has been very interesting. And I really applaud the
efforts of all of the presenters. And this is not
generally sort of the dialogue that I hear. I am a
professor at American University and I teach in the Civil
Practice Clinic. Prior to that, I was a litigator and I
sued prisons. And primarily what I sued prisons about was
about discrimination against women. One of the things that
I would note is that in the analysis that has been
presented, the conversations have been primarily about men.
There has been very little analysis at all about women.
And I think that when we talk about the structural
impediments in the prison system, and also the structural

impediments in our community in our world at large, one of
the big ones is sex discrimination. For all of you who
have gone in prisons, I am sure you have gone in prison
industries and seen women, probably not in federal systems
as much, but women making underwear and boxer shorts while
men are making cabinets, doing metalworking. And so what I
would like you to do is take that as a context and talk
about whether there is any difference in the social
benefits or social costs for women inmates as opposed to
men.
The other thing we also need to mention is that there is an
impact, I mean, we know that the numbers of women are
increasing. We seem to talk about this as a very small
population. But when you think about, again in terms of
the social cost and the people who are impacted, you are
not talking about just those women. You are also talking
about children and their families.
Another interesting statistic is that when women are
incarcerated, their children, about 76% of them, are cared
for by their family members, by their mothers. When men
are incarcerated, about 89% of their children are cared

for by the mothers of those children. So there is a
tremendous social cost on families that are taking care of
those kids and also on single female-headed households who
are sort of bearing the brunt of the absence of those
prisoners, whether they are male or female, from the
community. And so I would like you to talk about that.
And then finally, I was so glad that Wendell raised that
question about how do you split the pie. On Wednesday, I
was at the Eastern Regional Conference on Enforcement of
Child Support. And I was doing a panel on collecting child
support from jailed parents. And one of the things that I
think is very important here is that we be very clear that
as soon as it becomes clear that this is a source of money,
that there are going to be all kinds of people lining up.
It is not just room and board. It is medical expenses, it
is clothing, it is child support, it is victims services.
And so in doing that, in having those people lined up, one
of the basic assumptions that you have made is that
improvement in the system is really going to be about
improvement in morale.
People work in order to learn things, to have those
relationships that you get from jobs. But I work for
money. And that is what most people work for. And so if
you have a system where of the $300 they make they may get
5, aren't you really creating, in some ways, almost a
system of peonage where there really is no incentive for
people to work?
MR. LEVITT: I will take the first question with respect to
women and men. I think given our charge and given that we
are economists, what we did was abstract from the 90% of
the prison population that is men and we kind of threw out
the 10% that is women. And we did all of that
independently. But let me talk about it now, let me
revisit that.
One key point is that the crimes that women and men are in
prison for tend to be different. I don't know the exact
numbers, but the number of violent offenders among women is
much lower, proportionately, than men. The number of
drug-related offenses is much higher for women than men.
Also taking that point about the fact that child care is
done primarily by women and by the women's family when they
are in prison.
The way I would interpret this is to say there is a lot
better reason for having men in prison than women because
the social costs associated with violent crime are most

likely much higher than those related to drug-related
crime. And so in the broader perspective, I would say we
maybe should reallocate the prison population to stress
more violent offenders, and that would help the side effect
of having fewer women inmates.
Now, from the perspective of the social benefits of work, I
think the opposite is true, that in fact the social
benefits of prison industry would be greater for men than
for women, that there is more to be gained by having men
not recidivate than women not recidivate. And so it is
because men are the worst criminals and men are the ones
that aren't supporting their children, that we actually
wanted to give them the bigger boost, then we could take it
away and give it to the women who are not incarcerated.
So, and it is probably not the answer you want to hear, but
I think that is, sort of, that is what the economics
suggest.
Now, in terms of splitting the pie, again, talking as an
economist, it is just not an economic issue. Splitting the
pie is somewhat an economic issue just because of
incentives. But really it is a political issue. There is
a fixed amount of money out there and you want to split it
and there are a lot of people who want to get their hands
on it. And I don't think that is something that economists
necessarily have a lot of intelligence to provide guidance
on.
MR. KLING: I will say one other thing about the benefits
that might accrue to women, which is that it is really true
that there are fewer crimes being committed by people who
have participated in inmate labor programs, that the
victims of those crimes will tend to be women as well as
men. And so there is the potential for them to reach some
of those kinds of benefits as well, if that in fact turns
out to be true. But that is, as I tried to indicate
earlier, something about which we have a shred of
suggestive evidence but really need to know a lot more
about in order to base policy on something like that.
MR. KRUEGER: I just wanted to say two quick points. One
is that the social cost for encouraging more women inmate
laborers to work is smaller in that if you look at the
spillover effects on the private sector, women tend to be
in different occupations and industries in the private
sector than men. They are a much smaller proportion of
that workforce. So I think some of the social consequences
that we talked about earlier, about depressing wages for

less skilled workers would also be smaller.
Then the other point which Richard Freemanwhispered in my
ear, and Wendell Primus is probably more familiar with this
literature than I am, many of the interventions that have
been tried for low income populations, job training and so

forth, seem to be more effective for less skilled women.
So for that reason, I wouldn't be surprised if programs
such as work while in prison or training more generally
have higher payoffs for women than they do for men.
MR. MARSHALL: But this also indicates that they know more
about subjects. That is, in doing my quick search for this
I found very little on women and differentiating. So it is
clear to me that this is an area that if you really work on
trying to design an effective program, you would need to
know a lot more about it. And we could probably do
comparative work, see what they do in other countries. Or
in some states, I notice, you have much higher rate of
incarceration of women than others. Why? It would be
useful to pursue that and see what they do.
Moderator, MS. KASLOW: Most of the answers overlap with
your second question, but if you want to re-ask it, perhaps
a bit more focused, you will get a more focused answer.
And then reiterate your third, because I think we have all
forgotten it.
MS. SMITH: Right. I guess one of the things that I would
like to do just in terms of clarifying a couple of things
is that while women are definitely in, there are smaller
numbers of women who are in for violent offenses. We know
that women are primarily in for economic offenses, drugs,
passing bad checks. And so it seems to me that your

point that the benefits to them of increasing inmate labor
will be probably higher. I think that that is also true
given that women are slightly better educated, have less
behavioral problems in a prison system, and so would have
probably a quicker learning curve.
One of the things that I think we have to be clear about is
that while we might want to re-engineer the system and sort
of redistribute the prison population because it really is
of less social value -- and I say this because I am talking
in this context -- to have women incarcerated than men,
even though I argue that most of the people who are
incarcerated, there is not much social cost in having them
there because they are primarily drug offenders, that there
really isn't a distinction in reality for women as opposed
to men. And I think that there are also some very clear
things that happen to women as opposed to men in a public
policy context that I hope that the economists would take a
look at.
So for example, when you have in the welfare reform bill
that people who are convicted of felony drug offenses are
not eligible for public benefits, this has a much greater
impact on women than it does on men. The ban on these
inmates getting into public housing if they have a drug
offense also will have a greater impact on women than men
because they are primarily drug offenders and they are

primarily the people who have care for children.
MR. SULLIVAN: My name is Charlie Sullivan and I direct
CURE, Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants. And
in fact, as Mr. Marshall knows, we met with you before we
expanded to a national organization. I guess it has been
close to 15 years ago. We started in Texas and we always
say if we can survive prison reform in Texas we can survive
it anywhere. So we do have an organization of about 12,000
members, most of them all prisoners and their families. We
have, I think, state chapters presence in most states.
I would like, if I could, mention people that are missing
at the table. And one person who has been my teacher in
this issue for many years is not here and I would just like
to share with you who he is and encourage you to visit his
factories, his inmate work factories in Kansas City.
Fred Braun is a wonderful guy. He is also a Republican,
and I guess I consider myself a liberal, radical I guess,
Democrat. But it is a bipartisan issue. I think there are
many people here from all political persuasions. And I
think that is very important. We don't have a lot of
issues that both the Republicans and Democrats can get on
board on. But it has been my experience that it seems to be
very, very bipartisan. Fred Braun went to the governor of
Kansas and asked what he could do, and the governor, 25
years ago, even before the beginning of PIE programs by the
Justice Department, suggested to Fred that he go into the
prisons and train prisoners. So he has been doing this for
over 25 years. So, in fact, he always says to me, and this
is something I think is a great line that you want to use
when you talk to middle America, the Kiwanis or whatever,
if you really want to punish these guys, and women too,
make them taxpayers. And I think that is very important to
hammer away at.
Let me say, too, that he also, in his factories, he has the
ESOP program, which I think is great. And we have the
expert here, Norm Kurland, who is the expert from the
council, for Mr. Kelso, worked for him many years and could
tell us about it where prisoners actually, and also we are
talking about united whatever, but Norm could tell you
about this at break or whatever, but employees actually own
shares in the company, and that is happening out in his
factories.
Fred Braun also has started something for which I serve on
his board, it is called the Workmen's Fund, where he will
give to small businesses up to $50,000 to go into the
prisons. And so he has really been someone who is not only

an activist but also has a vision. And let me say the
final point -- which I think Congressman Scott's aide is
here, Bobby Vassar, we had quite a discussion at the break
that this issue of minimum wage or prevailing wage is
really a bogus issue -- but Fred Braun feels very strongly
that the minimum wage is the only thing that is going to
get businesses to go into prisons. And basically I think
he is saying that by seeking the prevailing wage was
killing the good by seeking the perfect.
I realize you are looking at the economic side of this, but
the victim impact has really been minimized in today's
presentations. And I am talking about not only the impact
to victims of violent crimes, but the impact to non-violent
crimes. I think it is very, very important. And anyone
who has ever had their house broken into or their car or
whatever, you never forget it. And I don't think that has
been measured today.
And the good side, the benefits of being able to turn a
prisoner around and not have that in the future, I think it
is just incredible to be able to, you just can't document
that. And also, at the same time, I don't think you can
document the rehab role models to prisoners, individuals.

Don Taylor was the first chair of our organization and he
was chairing, he was in eight jails before the age of 14.
He went down to the Texas Department of Corrections three
times for drug offenses. When he died two years ago, he
was chairing a national advisory committee to legislators.
And he did it by going to the LBJ School of Public Affairs,
got his Masters Degree in Public Affairs. And I have been
encouraging the head of the prison system in Texas to name
a program after Don. I think we need role models. We
don't, you know, in Texas, of course they are building so
many prisons, but they have got to name the ex-governor.
Why don't we name it after a successful prisoner, a
program, education. And the way Don did it was through
education. And we ought to begin to realize that we are
looking at this 2 million prison force and we need to, they
are looking for role models, people that have made it. And
so I don't think that has been mentioned today.
And let me get to my question. My question is education,
which Don was involved very much in. That is how he got
himself out of this hole. He dug himself out through
education. And I just feel, I just heard and read The
Lexus and the Olive Tree, which is on the best seller list.
I just encourage you to read this book and anybody that
reads this book and realizes the importance of how things

have changed since 1989, that we are in a new era.
I just do not see how a prisoner today can be educated
without access to computers. I just feel very strongly.
And I realize there can be abuses. And I know, for
example, Steve Schwalb, you probably have had to worry
about computers, et cetera, but there has got to be, I
think Congressman Cleo Fields ran in Louisiana for governor
on a computer in every prison cell. Now, that is what we
have got to, and that is going to be a very important issue
in all of this because of the security problems. But I
still think that they can be taken care of and still
prisoners can have access to computers.
Also, when they get out, I think besides being able to have
a good job, there is also a move to provide voting rights
for them, which Congressman Conyers had introduced. I
think that is extremely important. And also there has been
a little bit of a move toward doing something about
restrictions. Of all things the federal government now has
an optional form whereby you can go in and you do not have
to put your criminal background there. That will get you
into the interview so that that person who is interviewing
and sees you is not prejudiced that says this is an ex-con,
I am not going hire him, an ex-felon or whatever. They are
going to check, certainly. They are going to get to the
criminal justice system and access it, but you know that we
now have community notification with regard to sex
offenders, et cetera. So there are a lot of things that I
think we can begin to move away, to remove restrictions
with regard to employment. And the federal government in
this particular incident by having this optional form where
you don't have to put your criminal background down is a
first step.
So the question I am getting to is this. How in this day
and age is it essential, in your opinion, that prisoners
are able to have access to computers, looking at the
economy, where we are going, et cetera?
(Moderator) MS. KASLOW: Why don't we broaden that question
a bit because you raised so many interesting issues.
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, let me make a further issue. We just
eliminated Pell grants for prisoners in 1994. I mentioned
to my wife who is here. She said she thought there was too
much emphasis on low-skilled workers. They are low-skilled
because they don't have access to education. So what I am
saying is in regard to the education part of this, the
other side of the same coin with work, what is the role of

education in the privatization of prison?
MR MARSHALL: Well, I think the role of education is very
important. And I don't think we ought to concentrate on
low-skilled jobs at all. I think we ought to concentrate
on improving the skills of the workers. And it is very
clear to me from my work in education, particularly the Job
Corps, for example, which had developed a very effective
education system using computers and using teaching
machines, that we can move people, if we do it right, if it
is based on what we know about how people learn, much
faster than we do in ordinary schools. This is a
non-traditional learning process, and I would give maximum
attention to that in prisons. But I think that time that
you spend taking people as far as they can go in whatever
time they have got, and you can, with an efficient learning
process.
The other experience that we have had with this is that the
immediate barrier that you have to overcome in educating
people from low wage and low education backgrounds is to
convince them that they can, in fact, learn anything and
learn it in a hurry because most of these folks have been
programmed for failure from birth and don't believe they
can learn. So in all these, all of our activities, the
first thing that we do is to illustrate the principle that
any person can learn and that the only way you can cause
them to really believe that is to show them.
Now, I don't know if you know. We have got an experimental
program in Ft. O'Connor, Texas using these techniques about
what we learn. It is teaching algebra and geometry to the
Kindergarten and 1st Graders. They are one-third poor
White, one-third poor Black, one-third poor Hispanic, and
they are doing very well. I had a Ph.D. mathematician come
to work with me, said he didn't believe that they could do
that. I said, “Well, be scientific. Go see. And I will
tell them you are going to show up one day, you pick your
day.” And he went into a room, a little five-year old
Black girl was working away at something. He said, What
are you doing?” She said, “Well, today I am multiplying
fractions.” He said, “You can't multiply fractions.” And
she grabbed her pencil and squinted her eyes and said,
“Give me some.”
Well, you see, that is a hump that you have to overcome
with many of these. It is what my daughter found out in
the Massachusetts prison system, and in the Texas prison
system. Once you show them that they can, in fact, learn,
and we learned that in the Job Corps, then you have to

drive them out of the rooms at midnight, you know, because
they get so excited about the fact that they really can do
it. And we ought to take the best of what we know about
the learning technology and put it into the prisons.
MR. SULLIVAN: The only thing I would say is that I don't
think that computers, I think computers, if there are any
in prisons right now, they are very few and they are being
eliminated every day. And they could be, like you say,
self-education, where you could go into the night, teaching
yourself, et cetera. And I think we have got to be able to
keep those computers in.
MR. MARSHALL: Yes. And what you have to do, though, with
any technology, is to have a good theory of it, what is it
for and what is your use of it. And if you go in with the
wrong theory, you do the wrong thing. The typical
assumption is that the purpose of the technology is to
replace people. If that is your theory, you lose. If your
theory is that the use of the technology is to extend human
capabilities, you will win, because that is what it is
exactly designed to do, or that is the most effective use
of it. And so it is not just the computer, that is the
point I would make. We found in the Job Corps case, I
think about 95% of the kids, the youngsters in the Job
Corps took to the machine learning in a hurry. And it was
so different. See, the machines are self-paced,
non-judgmental, and color blind. And in our learning
systems, all of those things are barriers to learning, is
you get judgmental learning. And I can see where a lot
that we have learned about the use of the technology in
learning and the use of learning processes could be
applied, and I would be surprised if it weren't. I think
probably, if you did a proper study, you would find some of
the most progressive prison systems already doing some of
these things. Here or in some other countries.
MR. FREEMAN: Many of the prisoners get their GEDs. That
is obviously a big thing. There is a certain amount of
education going on. And the numbers that Alan and Jeff put
up, it was very implicit. They said high school degrees
and GEDs. And the typical non-prisoner got theirs through
a high school degree. I don't know what the prisoner break
is, but it is going to be very many people getting their
GEDs.
There is a problem you raise with the computer, which is
generalized from computers. Because gee, if you said to me
a computer in every prison cell, I would say wait a minute,

we haven't got a computer on every school desk. And I
think there is an issue of the prison thing, I do not think
we want generally to provide certain things to prisoners
that we are not providing equally to equally low-skilled,
disadvantaged people outside who decided even though they
didn't get high wages and didn't have a good opportunity
they weren't going to commit crimes. So I think that that
cuts on other issues as well.
My personal view would be computers are real cheap nowadays
and that we would like to see computers everyplace. It
would make Bill Gates happier, and we all know, he is a
Harvard dropout, proof that you don't have to get too much
education to be a success. But maybe there can be some
general discussion of this issue of if you are going to
provide something for the people in prison that is better
than, we have got to make sure that the poor people outside
have the same opportunities, et cetera. Otherwise, we set
up a funny system.
MR. KRUEGER: Let me comment a little bit on computers.
Most of what I do for a living is study the way computers
impact the labor market. Over half of all jobs now require
some knowledge of computer use. Harry Holzer did a study
in inner cities where he found that what employers are
looking for by and large or in large part is people who
have computer skills, not just executives, but all the way
down the line. So I think it is quite an important skill.
I don't know if I would say it is essential to get a job,
but it certainly helps.
There is a program that a Princeton alum -- the Detweiler
Foundation -- started to take obsolete computers, spiff
them up, make them faster, and then give them to schools.
It is primarily done in California. But one of the things
they do is to have inmates do some of the work on the
computers, changing the hard drives and so forth. A
program like that, expanding it, where the inmates also
learn how to repair computers, which is a job that is in
demand, as well as have the benefit of the formerly
obsolete computers I think is potentially very attractive.
It also is different than what you have outside. It is not
better. You have more obsolete equipment.
(Moderator) MS. KASLOW: Just that one more general
question, was you raised so many issues about preparing
would-be workers for the workforce eventually, and
computers being, obviously, one tool, but one of many
tools. What, in the economists' views, how far should we

be going from public expenditure, private sector
investment, various businesses taking this on, who should
be supplying the wherewithal for inmates to prepare, to
beef up their workforce preparedness? I mean, are we
talking about donations of technology, are we talking about
donations of time, expertise, mentoring, apprenticeships?
We have heard a lot of things mentioned today. The Job
Corps example is a splendid one. What are the nuts and
bolts of this in terms of, what do you think? It is an
open question.
MR. MARSHALL: Well, I would say all of the above.
Whatever. And different industries will have different
motives for making the equipment available. We find that
in most of our employment training programs now, that you
have to use some combination of public funds to make this
available to people.
But I would say a good way to explore it, I don't know
enough about it to know where this would come out, but
those people who benefit most from prison industry ought to
have some obligation to help reintegrate the ex-offenders

into society, including training, education. That might,
if you were putting together this bid process, which I
think has a lot of merit, you would put that down as one of
the things that you were expected to do if you were going
to be involved in this industry, to help give people the
kinds of education and training they need to make it in
society.
MR. WOODHEAD: Well, after all the speakers, I kind of feel
like the eighth prospective husband, especially after
Charlie's presentation, so many provocative ideas. It is
going to be difficult keeping it interesting. My name is
Greg Woodhead. I work at the Department of Public Policy
at the AFL CIO, and we try to fashion policy in the
interest of working families in America. We are the voice
of working families and we are especially the voice of
organized labor.
We represent free labor. We represent the service sector
and manufacturing workers in the private sector, and we
also represent the public sector workers who work in
correctional industries, both at the federal level and at
the state level. We have AFGE and we have AFSME, very
important representation. And so we have to balance the
interests of our federated union members to craft policy
that is beneficial for our members and also beneficial for
prisoners.
One thing that we have come to find out from

looking at this issue very carefully is that there is
really no simple answer to this problem. It is a complex
problem. It is a difficult problem. It does need more
study. I can suggest a few areas. I think we need more
longitudinal studies of the effects on employment and
re-employment, not just on the effects of reducing
recidivism, because I think in Ray Marshall's paper there
was an interesting study from Ohio that indicated that the
rates dropped among Black inmates released from 36% to 26%,
but a good controlled study showed that the rates did not
drop at all amongst White prisoners. So I think more of
these studies need to be done.
I think we need to look more carefully at joint
apprenticeship programs. We have to look at the
possibility of teaching entrepreneurship to prisoners. Why
should they only be relegated only to working on the
outside for somebody else? Teach them how to support
themselves in the private sector. This is where job
creation is.
And I think we need to study more carefully what is going
on in the state prison industry programs that may, in fact,
be selling goods across state lines in direct violation of
federal law and not be enrolled or participating in an
established PIE program.
Having said all that, I think we have a task ahead of us to
find out what is going on right now, and maybe craft some
policies to work to the benefit of prisoners while
protecting free labor and protecting the safety of
correctional officers inside the prisons.
I would commend you to Ray Marshall's paper. When Ray
Marshall says he doesn't really know that much about prison
industry, it reminds me of Sam Irving, Senator Irving,
saying he doesn't know that much, he is just a country
lawyer. I think Ray Marshall's paper really fairly
characterizes free labor's position on this issue and he
spells out what happened in the Iowa system, when, in fact,
the issue of apprenticeship and placing released prisoners
into private jobs was debated in union halls. And those
union members came to accept these graduates of apprentice
programs, which are very highly valued amongst union
members. So it can be done. And I think this is a program
that should be expanded.
The AFL CIO is, however, very concerned about the potential
expansion of prison labor. After all, we did lose 400,000
manufacturing jobs in the United States in the last year
alone. In that context, that economic context, being a

manufacturing worker and being asked to compete with
expanding prison industries is not a good prospect. At the
same time, we always have to be concerned with guard
safety, because we know that prison work is good and prison
work provides for guard safety.

I will make a couple of observations about the panelists'
presentations. At the macro-level, yes, the size of prison
industries is not overwhelming relative to the size of the
GDP. But at the micro-level the dislocation can be
devastating, especially if you can make a direct link, like
a case in Wisconsin with fabric gloves where a private
factory closed and a company ramped up production inside
the prison walls. So free labor was directly impacted.
Those cases are not good, especially if you are in a rural
area and your job prospects are not very good and you have
seniority in manufacturing and the transition to whatever
jobs are available is going to be very difficult.
We have real problems with privatization of prisons. The
inability to organize those privately run prisons, the
abuses, the potential abuse is well-documented in
television programs. That can be very problematic. I am
also concerned about just the notion of bidding out
prisoners to private companies. That just has a
connotation to it that is just disturbing if you follow
through with the implications of that.
Prevailing wages can be paid to prisoners. The PIE program
shows that. Maybe we have to have some imputed wage to
level the playing field somewhere between prevailing wage
and minimum wage. But we can't just say that the minimum
wage is enough and we just, that is the cap on

wages.
If any of you are interested in the latest position of the
AFL CIO with regard to prison industries, I have those
papers available if you give me a card sometime when we
are, in the afternoon -MS. KASLOW: Greg, why don't you pose a question to the
panel? Do you have a question for the panel economists?
MR. ROSENTHAL: I think that Greg brought up something that
maybe I can chastize my economist friends here. Most of
the models that they have been talking about in terms of
prison work has been on manufacturing, manufacturing little
things that are made in China, shoes, industries that are
leaving the United States. It has all been on
manufacturing, which economists tend to do in terms of
their economic models.
A very small percent, or not a very small percent, but a
smaller percent each year of our economy is associated with
manufacturing. And a large percent, as I showed in my
numbers, is outside manufacturing. Many of those jobs can
be done, are done, off the work site, especially using
computers. There are a lot of things that can be done
which don't focus on one industry.
You get into one industry, it is the type of thing that
Greg was bringing up, somebody is going to get upset, you
are on my turf. But if you can get some type of work that
spreads around, that is in a lot of industries, you don't
have that one focus getting in some type of work that can
be done everywhere. And I think maybe the welfare reform,
the type of success of the program is something that deals
with it. It is low skill level jobs because of the
educational background of the individuals, yet it is spread
out into lots of different jobs all over the country and
has been successful because they exist all over the country
as you see in the numbers.
And if that type of thing can be done, it has to be done
off the work site, obviously, in many cases. All of the
jobs don't get there. But computers is one. It has the
educational value. 50% of the workers or perhaps even
more -- I would bet you 90% or more of the people in this
room have a computer at their desk. And that is, it gets
into more and more different jobs. It gets to the
education

for higher level jobs, and I think that is something we
have to consider. It is not just focusing on one industry,
but on something that cuts across.
MR. KRUEGER: I am just curious if the AFL-CIO had a
position on what Ray Marshall called inmate councils or
unions for inmates.
MR. SULLIVAN:
MR. KRUEGER:

Company unions are bad idea in any form.
I think Ray would agree.

MR. SULLIVAN: I think it would be better served to look
very carefully at these joint apprenticeship programs,
because we are very much interested in what happens to
prisoners upon release. And this is a real source of union
membership and it is a real source of stable jobs, good
paying jobs with benefits, union jobs. So I like that
idea, but I don't like the idea of company unions.
MR. MARSHALL: But I will remind you, a lot of unions
started out as company unions. That is another advantage
of looking at the history. Communications Workers used to
be a company union. Steel Workers used to be a company
union. And the first stage in the development of many
unions was initially the workers had some way to represent
their interest in the workplace. Then they saw they needed
an independent source of power. And I think

that is the natural history of it. There is a natural
history that it is hard to have a long range collaborative
relationship between parties with unequal power. So as
soon as it works, so long as you didn't deal with any
important issue with the company unions. And as soon as
they got to tough issues, like whether we have a wage cut,
it fell apart and then they went and got steel workers or
communications workers, they organized an independent
union.
MR. PRIMUS: Can I make one more comment on a question?
And that is back to my issue of child support. I think,
since I have probably prison officials in the room, one of
the things that happens lots of times when these dads
become incarcerated is that the child support order isn't
changed. And so a year, two or three years after, when they
get out, they have an arrearage of five, ten thousand
dollars. And then, I know of one situation in Colorado,
they have that arrearage, they have their normal child
support order, then they also have a payment to the
victims, and so, and then they have the federal income tax,
and they typically, because their children don't reside
with them, don't get the EITC or any other kind of wage
subsidy. Their net wage, after leaving prison, assuming
they get a job, is very, very small. And I think we have
got to be concerned about these different institutions
being better coordinated.

I have come to the conclusion again from this, my efforts
on non-custodial parents, is that for many of the men
coming out of prison, we may need a bridge job, a publicly
funded job, to ease the transition, if you will, given that
they have got a conviction, et cetera, into the paid labor
force. I know, Secretary Marshall, you talked about
publicly funded jobs in the late-80s. What about that
idea, again, to help bridge the transition into, and help
them meet their parental responsibilities?
MR. MARSHALL: I believe that there is an important role to
be played for publicly funded jobs. In fact, a lot of jobs
are publicly funded that are called private jobs, like the
construction industry. But I think the best approach is to
have an array of policies available so that if you are
unable to find bridge jobs in the private sector, then it
might make some sense to have a public service job doing
useful things.
Our experience with the public service jobs actually has
been pretty good, in spite of all of the rhetoric about it.
Most of the evaluations showed that they did what they were
supposed to do. And I believe it is important to have the
bridge process that would make it possible for people to
get work.
But the first preference would be to get private jobs, that
is, to get a job that would lead somewhere. And I think we
ought to concentrate on that. But then if you are unable
to that, then I think the public job makes sense.
MR. WOODHEAD: We start down a slippery slope on that
argument because there is unemployment now in the free
world. That means we are going to have prisoners employed.
I mean, where does that stop? Drug treatment, there is
need for drug treatment in the free world. That means
prisoners don't qualify for drug treatment. I think you
start going down that line, you are going to end up with an
idle workforce with all kinds of behavioral problems that
we are not going to address because we are not addressing
these in the free world.
But if, like the data shows, if they come out, these
particular individuals, and commit two violent offenses,
and I think they said ten non-violent offenses, I think
society in its self-interest ought to be focusing in on
their problems, just from a self-interest. I think the
Pell grant argument, removing them, was used, that argument
was a very, very strong argument and they took them out

because of that.
MR. FREEMAN: Yes, I would, I mean, the Pell grants, any
normal thing that society is offering to citizens you don't
want to see removed. The right to vote is a very
interesting one because now they are back as citizens and
you would like to give them the right to vote. You are back
and you are part of the body politic and part of the
nation.
MR. WOODHEAD: And that is, and getting back to
international law, that is Article 25 of U.N. Declaration
of Human Rights, says that there should be universal
suffrage throughout the world. And so, I mean, I think
that issue, there are four states that do allow prisoners
to vote.
MR. FREEMAN: Yes, but let me put your thinking another
way. I can see all the economists here agreeing that if we
gave them a $25,000 check in two years for not committing
crimes, that that would pay off if they didn't commit
crimes. But now there is no way that would ever be
approved in the country, and it would, you know, because
there are other equally, no, more deserving folks,
including the victims. So there is a balancing act, I
think, that has got to be done. It has got to be done
carefully and cautiously.
I was thinking when you did the computer thing,
telemarketing. That could be done inside prisons, and is
done in some prisons. And that requires some, et cetera.
We could do other computer jobs using the internet that
prisoners could do that would not, the opposite of, you

know, non-manufacturing. There are all sorts of things.
But I think they all have to be careful. I have a friend
that runs a telemarketing firm. He might be upset if you
tell him the local prisoners are going to be doing it
unless we establish all the kinds of things that Steve had
so that it becomes a fair competition and doesn't adversely
effect the current people who are doing the telemarketing
who also will tend to be low educated folk.
MR. SULLIVAN: But I think that argument, I disagree very
much with that approach.
MR. PETERSIK: I am going to ask two really quick
questions. The first one is just a clarifying question.
When you all talk about participation in unions, do you
mean, in a sense, company unions or unions of inmates, or
were you primarily talking about being members of unions
which also exist beyond the walls?
MR. LEVITT: I think I was thinking of unions beyond the
walls. But I am open-minded about it.

MR. MARSHALL: Yes, I was, too. And I would say that just
as there are degrees of representation of workers now, the
workers at Saturn have much different kinds of powers than
the workers in a regular General Motors plant, and
therefore it is possible to think about an array of ways
for workers to be represented. I would say that the
essential ingredient, if it is going to be successful over
the long haul pull, is that whatever you call the
organization that represents the inmates, that it has to
have some independent source of power, independent from the
system, just like the company unions didn't work because
they didn't have an independent source of power, didn't
even work for the companies in the long run.
So I think it is possible to design a system so that you
would have degrees of representation just like we have in
the public sector now. And it would be a voluntary system.
I think it ought to be that if they want to have it and see
that it has a role. We develop a system to make that
possible. Another part of the system that I would think
would be beneficial to everybody involved is an alternative
dispute settlement process that would avoid litigation, or
at least minimize litigation.
MR. FREEMAN: Yes. It is a question for people who know
more than I do because the obvious easy way to deal

with this is to say something like there is a pretty good
prisoner or set of prisoners. They come work in a normal
workplace with free labor. They are paid the going rate.
It is the unionized workplace. Fine, they join the union.
If it is not a unionized place, they have the same right to
form a union as other people.
But the question is, to what extent do we have through
various work release programs prisoners working in normal,
free settings and then going back to prison at night. Is
that common, frequent, or totally rare? Could somebody
enlighten me, please?
MR. WOODHEAD: It is extraordinarily rare, I believe.
mean, if you are not counting work release.

I

MS. SMITH: He is counting work release. I think that is
pretty standard, though. I think that depending on what
kinds of incidents you have had, like you have had a major
incident where someone who is out on work release went out
and committed some offense, I mean, those programs either
expand or constrict depending on what has happened in terms
of the public opinion. But that is fairly routine.
I think that it is an interesting question because

I know, for example, for inmates who work in prison
industries, they, of course, are not considered as
employees for purposes of discrimination laws or whatever.
I think that is an interesting question about whether if
somebody were on a work release program and they went out
and they were working whether they could join a union. And
I wouldn't be surprised if there were some restrictions in
terms of the department in terms of whether they could do
that.
MR. SCHWALB: From the practical standpoint of a prison
manager, I don't think we care what job the prisoner has on
work release, what they make, and who they are affiliated
with. The reality is at the county and state level is
where you see most of that, because the only people that
feel comfortable enough from a public safety perspective,
or the judge feels comfortable enough in terms of
sanctioning options at sentencing, even putting in on work
release, are people who are usually misdemeanors serving
relatively short periods of time. So as soon as you have a
population, like at the federal system, which is 100%
felons, it is really not an option. But I don't see why
from a prisoner manager standpoint, it would make any
difference what they were affiliated with, doing on the
outside, as long as it was legal.
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Afternoon Small-Group Sessions
After the panel (and lunch) afternoon small-group sessions identified key viewpoints and
action recommendations from varying stakeholder perspectives. The sessions were
organized and assisted by professional facilitators from The Public Conversations
Project, of Watertown, Massachusetts. Speakers from the morning sessions were
available for consultation.
Because of (1) the wide range of stakeholders with widely differing perspectives, (2) the
newness of the issue to many participants, (3) the novelty of the economists’ views, and
(4) the limitations of time, goals for afternoon sessions were defined within rather than
across stakeholder groups. Participants were assigned based on registration information,
to groups including corrections, correctional industries, corrections reform, economics,
economic development, education and training, families, fathers, health and substance
abuse, inmates and inmate labor, labor economics, labor unions, lawmakers, victims,
women and children, and others.
Groups were to identify (1) important features of promise in the economics of inmate
labor, (2) principal issues of concern, and (3) key actions to be taken. A verbatim record
of stakeholder views is provided in the symposium transcript. In general, groups
emphasized the following points:
Positives – Points of View or Alternatives Viewed Favorably
● Most were encouraged that the economists viewed inmate employment as a good.
● Assessing inmate employment’s minor effects on the larger economy was viewed
favorably, as eliminating concerns of threat to the overall society.
● Most were encouraged that inmate employment would likely reduce recidivism.
● Inmates’ ability to contribute to child and family support was favorably viewed.
● Some were encouraged by the need for and emphasis on education and training.
Negatives – Issues of Concern
● Participants repeated concerns that the benefit of reduced recidivism through
employment may be assumed rather than demonstrated.
● Ignorance of prisons and of the specific components of work yielding success
weakened the more general optimism for the posed benefits of inmate work.

● Concerns were raised about the absence of specific implementation steps
necessary for success.
● Transitional and post-release adjustment issues were repeatedly raised as
concerns, including education and training, and support in reintegrating to
families, jobs, and communities.
● In the symposium, the absences of participation by and attention to minorities and
females were raised as key issues of concern.
● Lack of attention to experiences outside the United States was raised as a serious
concern.
● Concerns were raised about the possibility of affording market-wages for inmate
employees.
Recommended Actions
In general, participants found existing evidence on either the benefits or the costs of
inmate employment to be fairly thin and not fully convincing and a lack of specifics in
both the bases and recommendations for action. Therefore, the major recommendations
for action focused on learning and research.
● Both the measurement of recidivism effects of inmate employment and the
explanation o f the components of employment reducing recidivism need much
more research.
● The social processes of adjustment, including via education, need additional
research.
● Demonstration programs are sorely needed, in education and training, in
employment, and in transition and community integration.
● Effects of inmate unemployment and employment on children, families, and
family reintegration after release badly need research attention.
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On May 21, 1999 at the National Symposium on “The Economics of Inmate Labor Force
Participation,” five prominent U.S. economists provided introductory opinions on: (1)
whether inmates participating in the labor force would be good or bad for the U.S.
economy, (2) what would happen to civilian labor if inmates were to participate, and (3)
their recommendations for U.S. inmate labor force policies.
Although reading each economist’s opinion is necessary to gain a full appreciation of
their conclusions, there was general agreement that ● Inmate labor force participation would be good for the U.S. economy because it
would increase the Nation’s output of goods and services. Inmate employment
would increase Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and be generally good for consumers,
business, government and taxpayers. Inmate participation would have special
significance for compensated victims, prisoners, and prisoners’ children and families.
However, the overall economic gain would likely be small, because the inmate
population is a small percentage of the U.S. workforce and inmates are, on average,
less productive than the overall labor force. According to the economists, the increase
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would likely be small, equaling much less than 1
percent of GDP.
● The greatest social and economic benefit from inmate labor force participation
would likely come from reduced future crime and recidivism resulting from the
improved post-release behavior of offenders. The magnitude of this benefit is
uncertain. Moreover, in the event that lower incomes for low-wage civilians resulted
in additional crime, the possibility of net harmful effects could not be excluded.
● Inmate labor force participation would have little or no discernible effect on U.S.
civilian labor overall, but might slightly reduce the wage rate and employment
levels for low-wage civilian workers. But because inmates disproportionately come
from lower-income populations, losses to low-wage civilians might be offset (to an

unknown degree) by reduced crime and the positive income benefits to these same
populations from inmate employment.
● Policy Recommendations: The roots of inefficiencies in current inmate labor and
prison industries are: (1) the absence of a free market; and (2) rules favoring
government-owned prison industries. Therefore, public policies in inmate labor
and prison industries should introduce the free market and use the same rules
for prison industries as for private industry competitors.  Specifically, the
economists generally recommended 1. Privatize prison industries or remove all competitive advantages of
government-owned prison industries, particularly-● Eliminate preference in sale to government markets
● Use open-market bidding for use of the inmate labor force
2. Apply the same standards for inmates as for civilian labor, including-● Identical wage standards, including application of the Federal minimum wage
● Identical application of civilian labor law, including the Fair Labor Standards
Act, Workers Compensation, and health and safety standards.
3. Allow inmates to join unions or an alternative form of organization, to provide
some representation in bargaining employment and terms
4. Invest in raising inmate productivity with access to training, education,
counseling, and treatment
In addition, each economist offered additional comments. Ray Marshall emphasized the
importance of recognizing the historical context of stakeholders and issues. Alan
Krueger, Jeff Kling, and Steven Levitt recognized the possibility of subsidizing inmate
labor if social benefits (such as crime reduction or reduced costs of prison operation)
exceeded private benefits. Richard Freeman offered the alternative of inmates recapturing
jobs previously lost to foreign firms, noting the possibility of inducing crime if low-wage
domestic civilian labor were severely harmed.
Afternoon discussion groups allowed participants and speakers to explore issues in more
detail. In general, participants found existing evidence on the benefits or costs of inmate
employment to be lacking and less than convincing. Therefore, their recommendations
for action focused on learning and research:
● Both the measurement of recidivism effects of inmate employment and the
explanation of the components of employment reducing recidivism need much
more research
● The social processes of adjustment, including via education, need additional
research

● Demonstration programs are sorely needed, in education and training, in
employment, and in transition and community integration.
● Effects of inmate unemployment and employment on children, families, and
family reintegration after release badly need research attention.
The economists’ opinions are also available on www.correction.org

